No, I think the whole problem can be bypassed, check my answer above.
"Lengths" like, err, making a thought experiment like the above in a HN thread? I've went further than that just to get a bag of Pringles.
And it's not like it's a "simple evolutionary incentive" anymore. That might hold true for a lizard or a deer, but a human has more complex rational to want to live. It might be evolutionary still, but it's far from "simple" when you can think about it.
But no, I don't agree with you that humans' desire to live is any more real or special than a lizard's, or a tree's, or a rock's desire not to break apart for that matter. It's a natural extension of physical laws combined with the circumstances of our evolution as a system--in this case linked directly to our basest subconscious instincts. To say that your desire to live is fundamentally stronger or more complicated than that of a deer reeks of geocentrism of the ancient world to me.
You say "more real or special" here, though, whereas you said "simpler" in your previous comment.
You get back to the same argument at the end though: "To say that your desire to live is fundamentally stronger or more complicated than that of a deer reeks of geocentrism of the ancient world to me."
It might not be more "real or special" or "stronger" (I never argued that it was anyway), but it SURE is more complicated.
And to deny that reeks of obsessive reductionism to me. The desire to live as expressed and felt by some billion (trillion?) neurons of a human, is more complex than the desire to live as expressed by the primitive brain of a lizard, or even a "rock's desire not to break apart" (!). I don't even think we can call the latter "desire".
We can feel everything a deer can feel about the desire to live (horror, survival instinct, etc --we're animals after all), but ON TOP OF THIS we can write poems, sing songs, make movies and have deep conversations about it. Including massive institutions on the matter, such as religion.
I'd call that more complex --calling it anything else would be delusional.
In the naive way of making a copy of it, yes.
But consider this: with some future procedure, each neuron of your brain is replaced by a mechanical one, one at the time. You maintain your consciousness at all times.
In the end of the process, you now have a fully mechanical brain.
No philosophical conundrum this way, right?
>The universe eventually dies, too. 10 billion years is not immortality.
Yeah, I don't care, 100-200 million years sound enough for me until I get bored.
I wouldn't be so sure: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
how old do i need to be before holding a funeral for my past self?
what about special ceremonies for people coming out of medical sedation or comas or just waking up in the morning? a "fractional welcome to the universe party" seems in order, as the person is not really the same one that used to exist.
if upload tech like batista describes is ever created, we will probably give the resulting person the same common sense benefit of the doubt we give to people in the above cases.
Plus, this problem is solved in practice for us humans anyway: all of our cells are regenerated and replaced by new ones every few years, yet we consider ourselves to be the same persons.
I'm not making any particular claim that our identity as minds hinges on these three types of cells (though such a case for the brain cells seems, prima facie, like a possible good direction), but if you are going to make claims about what our identity as minds does not hinge on, you should take more care to get the facts straight.
ref1: http://www.thenakedscientists.com/HTML/content/latest-questi... ref2: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/aprilholladay/2007-03...
The common objections don't change this. "Uploading your brain" is an unsolved philosophical conundrum that may or may not continue the existence of "you".
The universe eventually dies, too. 10 billion years is not immortality. Escaping to a newer younger universe is a pure speculation.
Everyone will die.