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Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by jon-wood on Sunday November 05, 2023 @06:53AM (#38150348)
This is a massive overstatement of the situation. Sure, a TPM might not protect you against the NSA or the Chinese government stealing your computer. If configured correctly it probably will protect you against anything less than a major nation state stealing your computer.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by justaj on Sunday November 05, 2023 @07:21AM (#38150504)
But wouldn't a properly configured LUKS encryption protect against nation-state threats too? If so, then why still use TPM?
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by alufers on Sunday November 05, 2023 @07:38AM (#38150621)
Convenience, faster boot. Or if you have a headless server with disk encryption, but you want it to come back online without intervention after a reboot or power failure.

It's all trade-offs.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by SV_BubbleTime on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:25AM (#38151379)
In the scenario of headless, if I’m not missing something this only prevents drives from walking off. If the whole machine walks off you are in just as much trouble as not being encrypted at all if you don’t really trust your OS permissions systems?
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by Nextgrid on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:40AM (#38151505)
The whole machine walking off is more detectable though. You can use TPM as one factor (among many, such as the presence of the machine on the expected network and no unexpected downtimes) to obtain storage keys from a separate trusted server, using TPM remote attestation to assert the machine hasn't been tampered with in-place (by merely booting it off a compromised OS).
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by Asmod4n on Sunday November 05, 2023 @10:03AM (#38151697)
When someone steals your device and try’s to guess a user password a tpm can just throw away it's keys. (Or something similar)

Try it on a secure boot and tpm2 enabled Bitlocker encrypted drive, the only way to get in is via the recovery key after a configurable number of attempts.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by alufers on Sunday November 05, 2023 @10:08AM (#38151752)
If you take some basic precautions - disable interrupting the boot process, serial console, etc. then bypassing that requires significant effort. As an attacker you need to know the versions of the software working on the server, know some exploit and then have the experise to use it.

For example I know that the police in my country use off the shelf disk cloning devices and then some basic forensics software for analyzing the disk image. This can be done by an average computer technician, and such a TPM scheme would totally prevent them from extracting data. Of course for bigger cases they can invest some more effort, but they would have to be sure that there is some important data there to justify the cost.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by LtWorf on Sunday November 05, 2023 @12:32PM (#38153344)
Basically "the client requested it without understanding it makes no sense, so we did this thing"
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by lostmsu on Sunday November 05, 2023 @07:36AM (#38150611)
If machine is not attached to a terminal it is useful if it boots on its own.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by immibis on Sunday November 05, 2023 @10:58AM (#38152236)
Then it still boots on its own if the bad guy has it.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by izacus on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:05AM (#38152314)
And that's fine, it'll boot to macOS/Linux/Windows login screen and that's it.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by Nextgrid on Sunday November 05, 2023 @07:29PM (#38157317)
Also, if it's able to phone home in this state, it can be managed remotely including remote erase (whether of the storage drive or the TPM keys) if needed.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by jon-wood on Sunday November 05, 2023 @07:59AM (#38150757)
TPM based encryption is hugely useful in embedded devices, where you really don’t want to have to despatch someone to type the passphrase in. By driving it via the TPM you’re protected against someone removing the storage and being able to read the decryption key off it, and you’re also protected against someone modifying the components required to get to a decrypted disk to inject code you weren’t expecting - if the kernel or bootloader is modified then the device simply won’t boot.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by pmontra on Sunday November 05, 2023 @08:24AM (#38150921)
With an embedded device isn't easier to just steal the device instead of only the storage and making the device useless anyway?
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by bmicraft on Sunday November 05, 2023 @08:36AM (#38151002)
In this scenario protecting the secrets on the device is supposedly more important that the monetary value of the device itself.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by SV_BubbleTime on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:24AM (#38151363)
I sell a device. There are lots of them in hands. You still aren’t getting my device key off of it. Yes, you can use that device all you like, but you aren’t going to clone it and make more.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by sillystuff on Sunday November 05, 2023 @10:36AM (#38152018)
You've described DRM; this is exactly why a lot of people are wary of TPMs.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by lxgr on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:35AM (#38152658)
No, DRM is safeguarding other people's keys on your device.

There's more applications of trusted computing and TPMs than that; one of them is using it to safeguard your own keys.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by sillystuff on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:42AM (#38152738)
> DRM is safeguarding other people's keys on your device.

I think you misread the GP. Your definition of DRM is exactly what GP described as his use of the TPM.

>>I sell a device. There are lots of them in hands. You still aren’t getting my device key off of it. Yes, you can use that device all you like, but you aren’t going to clone it and make more.

What the GP describes is not safeguarding the nominal owner of the devices' keys. GP is restricting the nominal owner of the device on behalf of himself as the manufacturer. This is leveraging the TPM for DRM.

Other possible less nefarious uses of the TPM are irrelevant to this point.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by lxgr on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:52AM (#38152863)
Oh, I indeed read that as "I [re]sell a device". In the case of them selling devices with embedded non-extractable keys, it could really be DRM.

Or something else! Payment cards work like that – they hold keys that nobody is supposed to be able to duplicate; certainly not third-parties, but also not the legitimate account-/cardholder.

There are plenty of uses for trusted computing other than DRM; they're just usually not as disruptive/frustrating to legitimate customers as DRM (and as a result are not as contentious), so they don't get as much attention.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by zlg_codes on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:19PM (#38158811)
What moral right do they have to put data on devices you own?

TPMs jeopardize the ownership of a device. Consumer devices are already sold where you can't (easily) inspect or change anything.

Even a user-controlled TPM can be used as storage for keys used to usurp control of the device. The existence of IME and PSP enables manufacturers to have more control over computing devices than the people who buy and operate them.

There is no moral defense for sabotaging ownership.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by jon-wood on Monday November 06, 2023 @05:06AM (#38160658)
I genuinely wish things were this binary. I’m a hacker (using the original definition) at heart, I want to turn random devices I own into other things, which would be so much easier if it weren’t for encrypted storage and signed boot chains.

That’s all very well until you start talking about hardware that does things like providing video of the inside of someone’s home. I’m still behind being able to modify them and use them as you please, but if you do so that should be self-evident, because otherwise *someone else* can do so, and you won’t know until video appears on the internet if you walking back from the shower.

TPMs don’t necessarily mean that you can’t modify a device you’ve bought, it just means that things like the API key which connected it to the backend will be invalidated and you’ll have to set the device up some other way. That’s a safety mechanism, and even I want it to be present in hardware I buy.

Likewise I don’t want someone to be able to take a doorbell from the front of my house, extract my wifi credentials from it, and pivot from that to compromising the entire network.

I’m sure some people will say “well just don’t have those things”, and I’m inclined to agree, despite having worked on such devices I’m not sure they’re actually hugely useful to most people. People are buying them though, they’re in the wild, let’s make them as secure as possible.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by patrakov on Monday November 06, 2023 @04:10AM (#38160310)
Let me reply item-by-item.

> No, DRM is safeguarding other people's keys on your device.

Correct - in this case, safeguarding mainly means making sure that the nominal owner of the device does not extract the keys.

> There's more applications of trusted computing and TPMs than that

Correct

> one of them is using it to safeguard your own keys.

Questionable - needs a definition of safeguarding. Making sure that the keys cannot be backed up would be a strange definition.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by matheusmoreira on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:04PM (#38157948)
It's all about who owns the keys. If we own the keys, the technology empowers us. If they own the keys, the technology oppresses us.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by jon-wood on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:29AM (#38151421)
At least the embedded devices I work on don’t expose any (reasonable) method to persuade them to do anything other than their intended job, so sure, steal the device if you like. With enough effort you can probably turn it into a general purpose computer, but you’re not getting any of the secrets off it.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by cyberax on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:43AM (#38151545)
Yes, but you'll need to enter a long password on every boot.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by goodpoint on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:23AM (#38151357)
No, it's worse. It's *making* you vulnerable to those actors and possibly more.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by Nextgrid on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:27AM (#38151396)
The majority of people don't want to type a long passphrase every boot (or would pick a trivially-bruteforceable one) and FDE-backed TPM (even if vulnerable to state-sponsored attacks) is better than what it would otherwise be which is no FDE at all.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by mjg59 on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:42AM (#38152741)
Eh no that's not true. If a device uses a discrete TPM and isn't using authenticated sessions it's trivial to sniff the bus and extract the encryption key. If it is then it's less trivial because you need to interpose the TPM but that's still in "Can solder SMT parts" territory, not major nation state.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by Bognar on Sunday November 05, 2023 @01:47PM (#38154230)
You can only extract the encryption key if using the unencrypted APIs. You can establish and require an encrypted channel with the TPM if you know which TPM you are expecting.