1. Major browsers (Chrome, Safari, Edge) only accept certificates which are published in Certificate Transparency logs.
2. If a CA is discovered to have issued MitM certificates, they are swiftly distrusted by browsers.
So it's not really viable to use the existing CA system for MitM attacks.
The eIDAS proposal would:
1. Prevent browsers from distrusting CAs which are used in MitM attacks.
2. Ban mandatory checks (such as Certificate Transparency) on certificates unless the EU agrees to them.
That creates a system that is very viable for government MitM attacks.
Thats reassuring but, not knowing much about this, I have a couple of questions:
1. Is this proactively monitored for? And how? And by whom?
2. If a major state-level CA was discovered to have issued a mitm cert, would browser vendors really take the commercial hit of removing or distrusting their root cert?
Yes, security researchers like myself are constantly looking in CT logs for suspicious certificates, and I've found many, most notably Symantec issuing certs for example.com (https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.security.policy/c/fy...) and Certinomis issuing for test.com (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1496088). Both CAs were eventually distrusted. (But Certinomis will be back once eIDAS is adopted!)
Domain owners can use Certificate Transparency Monitors to learn about suspicious certificates for their own domains. Here are some monitors:
https://crt.sh/ - allows you to search for certificates for a domain
https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter/ - open source tool which notifies you when a certificate is issued for one of your domains
https://sslmate.com/certspotter/ - commercial service that does the same, operated by my company
> 2. If a major state-level CA was discovered to have issued a mitm cert, would browser vendors really take the commercial hit of removing or distrusting their root cert?
In 2017, Chrome and Firefox distrusted Symantec, which was at the time the world's largest certificate authority: https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/chromes-plan-to-dist...
Symantec hadn't even issued MitM certs - they were just grossly incompetent. Distrusting them was very painful, but necessary to uphold the integrity of the CA system, and demonstrated conclusively that there is no such thing as a too-big-to-fail CA.
If you're a security researcher monitoring other people's domains, you have to rely on heuristics - e.g. if a domain has a long history of getting certs from a major US CA, and then suddenly a tiny European CA issues them a certificate, that's pretty suspicious.
The system works best if domain owners are monitoring their own domains, because only they know for sure if a certificate is authorized or not.
Follow-up question: presumably, a state actor with dominion or leverage over a CA can coerce said CA into issuing a certificate, right?
The threat of distrust means CAs have a very strong incentive to contest any government orders, since if they comply their business is destroyed.
Care to point out where I said that?
example.com and test.com are real domains, and their owners did not authorize those certificates to be issued, so issuing them was a serious breach of the trust which CAs are expected to uphold. Furthermore, the discovery of these certificates led to investigations which turned up additional issues which are documented in detail here:
Pretty much every browser distrusted the root certificate from Spain's FNMT-RCM for a decade, so I think the answer's yes.
An interesting experiment would be to log all certificates used by the sites you normally use, say for a month, and then look at the list for anything shady. I have no ideia if an extension exists that would allow such and experiment, but the resulting list would be much more useful.
Now, there are CAA DNS records, which serve the purpose of restricting the CAs that can sign a particular domain, which would of course be ignored by the malicious actor, but _could_ be checked by the end user's browser. But to the best of my knowledge, no browser does that.
But if your own government tells your own isp to reroute just your traffic over some MITM proxy, it's only you there to notice, and most probably, you won't.
And you're certainly right about government-mandated traffic hijacking.
With certificate logs there is a chance, I don’t know how high, to catch 1).
For someone living in the West, what are the consequences of deleting or distrusting those CAs?
If you run into some websites which use them the browser will tell you that the certificate is invalid; you can always reinstall them if you prefer.
It's your own government that can actually do something bad to you.
(unless you're doing some really really nasty stuff, and china wants to eliminate you for those reasons, and is willing to create a large international incident because of that).
An example of what China can do is they can have their workers put pressure on you. Often this pressure is soft, nothing as direct as 'do X or we hurt you with Y'. And often the request, at least at the start, is for something legal and only a bit unethical if even that. A little information to help win a contract, maybe a way to advertise to you why you should go with their vendor for a product, maybe just asking you if a specific coworker seems to have any interest in some odd topic or passing you a resume of someone who seems a good fit for the job. If they can they'll push for more with increasing levels of silver and lead, and if not, they use what they did get to pressure elsewhere.
For example, CAs present in Firefox, that might give you pause: Beijing Certificate Authority, China Financial CA, Guang Dong CA
The CA system in browsers is inherently broken and it allows state actors to MITM you and see all your traffic if they: 1. have ability to capture IP traffic (requires cooperation with ISP) 2. have ability to generate rogue certificate via cooperation with CA