I've been following OAuth 2.1 for a couple of years. Can't wait for it to get released. If you want to check out the IETF draft, here is the current version: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-09.htm...
Reading the "Differences from OAuth 2.0" section is helpful for understanding what changes are coming: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-09.htm...
You can also give your feedback on this or any other draft on the IETF OAuth mailing list: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
I've been lurking there for a long time and learned a lot; you can view the archives here: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/
What makes this an implicit grant problems?
That said, Facebook Connect is an under-documented vendor extension to OAuth, and only is supported for use via the official SDKs. They do now have a bit more alignment with OpenID Connect and PKCE as an option, but I imagine most existing parties do not use it. https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/guides/a...
The decisions that are most important to the security of your application are:
- The authorization endpoint will only return authorization codes, which can later be exchanged for access tokens.
- Password credentials grants, implicit grants, client credentials grants, and all extension grants are not supported.
- Public clients are not supported.
- Every client is required to register its redirect_uri.
- All authorization, token, and API requests are required to use TLS encryption in order to prevent credentials from being leaked to a third-party. In addition, the registered redirect_uri must also be secured with TLS.
- Clients are required to CSRF-protect their redirection endpoints.
https://djoauth2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/overview.html#what...The guys who implemented this in the flawed way are probably at least twice as productive as the guys who'd thoroughly read the task and implement it correctly.