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Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by KairuByte on Friday October 20, 2023 @10:17PM (#37963505)
Because the attacker can simply request new keys. There’s nothing stopping them from going “hey LE, I need a new key! This is my domain, here is the challenge, give me my cert!” And LE will oblige, because as far as it can tell, they are you.

Edit: To be clear, this is a problem with a solution. But you asked why simply throwing a LE cert into the mix wouldn’t prevent the issue.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Groxx on Friday October 20, 2023 @10:28PM (#37963552)
Ownership is already handled by checking DNS (and this thread covers a way to make that even more secure, which LE supports), and as far as I can tell neither has nothing to do with preventing MITM between LE and your servers.

And no, I don't mean throwing LE certs around to prevent MITM - this whole article is about the difficulties before having an LE cert, so that's necessarily excluded.

I'm wondering "why not client certificates". They're a well established way to stop MITM, seems like a simple choice for the ownership validation step.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by salawat on Saturday October 21, 2023 @02:33PM (#37969336)
Have you ever tried to explain key distribution/management to a normal person?

You should try it sometime.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Groxx on Monday October 23, 2023 @06:40PM (#37992588)
[delayed]