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Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Groxx on Friday October 20, 2023 @07:13PM (#37962527)
Interesting and I can see some of the benefits, particularly in preventing DNS controllers from going to other CAs and making new keys, but... this all seems like a weird run-around for the MITM part.

Couldn't you exchange public keys with LetsEncrypt (in the web UI) and encrypt the response so you can't be MITMed? Why is http even an issue?

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by KairuByte on Friday October 20, 2023 @10:17PM (#37963505)
Because the attacker can simply request new keys. There’s nothing stopping them from going “hey LE, I need a new key! This is my domain, here is the challenge, give me my cert!” And LE will oblige, because as far as it can tell, they are you.

Edit: To be clear, this is a problem with a solution. But you asked why simply throwing a LE cert into the mix wouldn’t prevent the issue.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Groxx on Friday October 20, 2023 @10:28PM (#37963552)
Ownership is already handled by checking DNS (and this thread covers a way to make that even more secure, which LE supports), and as far as I can tell neither has nothing to do with preventing MITM between LE and your servers.

And no, I don't mean throwing LE certs around to prevent MITM - this whole article is about the difficulties before having an LE cert, so that's necessarily excluded.

I'm wondering "why not client certificates". They're a well established way to stop MITM, seems like a simple choice for the ownership validation step.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by salawat on Saturday October 21, 2023 @02:33PM (#37969336)
Have you ever tried to explain key distribution/management to a normal person?

You should try it sometime.

Re:Encrypted traffic interception on Hetzner and Linode targ... by Groxx on Monday October 23, 2023 @06:40PM (#37992588)
[delayed]