This is a singularly bad analogy. HIV used to be a death sentence, but now we have effective treatments and prophylactics.
What's the PrEP equivalent for buffer overflows? There isn't one.
I _love_ C and I've written one C program every year for the last decade or two. I generally write something really stupid, but there's going to be crashes that "prints the stack pants." As in: I'll fudge up returning the stack from a function, basically.
This proves nothing, of course. But Rust won't even let me fudge things up that way. This means that I have more time to spend fixing those other classes of bugs and that is the win!
For instance I find it incredible that you never had to debug and workaround a third party vendor DLL that you didn't have source for but that was leaking memory like crazy. Whenever I talk to colleagues in embedded development such stories always come up.
And no, we didn't have major issues with memory leaks either. About on par with what I have seen in garbage collected languages. RAII works quite good most of the time.
I get how that would be characterized as "trivially fixable", but I assure you that this is not the kind of projects people complain about when they discuss memory safety issues.
Consider that some people need to send emails to vendor companies begging them to stop segfaulting, writing the stack or leaking memory. You're lucky if it gets fixed in a few months, because that means you wouldn't have to seek alternatives which would be even more time consuming. In conclusion, there are many people out there dealing with memory safety issues which are anything but "trivially fixable".
Then people could decide which ones to use based on the label alone. This would be an incentive for people to fix their libraries.
Then the process of normal attrition would take care of all the sloppy libraries.
Evolution at its finest.
Had UNIX not been free beer, history would have been quite different for C and C++.
I am all for making C and C++ safer by adding mitigations for the most common security relevant bugs. Either on language level, or on tooling level or on OS level or on CPU level. Or a combination of them. But since making a language absolutely memory safe doesn't make it automatically impossible to have bugs at all (even security relevant bugs), we should consider everything a trade-off.