What do you think about trying something like, "Good points about using a password manager. I think Bitwarden is better than 1password becuase it: is open source, it can be self hosted, and you could switch to a fork if they get shady."
Because you wouldn't be implicitly calling them ignorant this way, they're more likely to hear your message.
Your claim that something is good because millions use it is weak. Millions use it because millions are dumb AF and its a commercial product that uses money to promote it that tells the dumb masses to use it and they happily comply.
Bitwarden is also a commercial product but its Open Source and open source is always better and I should not need to explain this to a HN crowd.
Isn't there still a "Secret Key" that you have to keep somewhere? It's a long random string, too, so you can't easily memorize it. I always lose this and have to keep it somewhere super-unsafe... it's the weakest part of my security, ironically.
You can have 2 trusted people be administrators of the 1P account. Then you create a shared vault for anyone who needs access to the master credentials and store them all in said shared vault. You can have multiple vaults with multiple different sets of credentials and access (Ex a vault for HR is going to have different creds and people than a vault for DevOps). Note: The list of administrators and the list of people with access to the shared vault doesn't need to be the same people.
If someone who's in the trust circle quits or gets fired, you have someone else remove their access (just like any other offboarding) and go change the applicable credentials.
As for insider threat, there isn't a lot you can do if you give someone access to the credentials. For the admin, that should be easy - certainly, you can find 2 people in an organization who can be trusted implicitly (even if one of them is required to be the CEO/founder). If you're worried that someone is going to go rogue, then don't give them access to the information in the first place.
There is some stuff that just doesn't need to be broadly shared...lets say master passwords for AWS accounts. Really very very very few people will ever need those - mostly for "Break glass in case of emergency" purposes, right? So your Director of DevOps has access and maybe one other person. If you can't trust that Director of DevOps to have those credentials.... well honestly your organization has bigger issues.