But the true answer is probably "all of the above".

I've never used OF but assumed they take a cut. Through Jitsi a performer could arrange for payment via crypto, protect their identity, and not pay a cut to any middle-men beyond the crypto fees. What am I missing?

is requiring Oauth from Facebook, Google or Github for hosts something meaningful, necessary or the obligation of Jitsi Meet to do at all

the only people that have to identify problems and solutions are founders that are grifting for capital or customers. and that’s sad.

the rest of rational actors can see a false dilemmas from afar without knowing what the third and fourth and fifth possibilities are.

in this case its pretty obvious that “privacy for hosts, or not via FAANG Oauth and an unaccountable change in the terms of service to further distance from privacy” is a false dilemma while also not preventing anonymous CSAM rooms on their service.

3. the same signup requirements for the participants instead of just the host

4. phone number verification for the host and participants

5. a credit card for the host and participants

6. some kind of deposit for the host and participants

7. discriminating against Tor users

8. including Apple ID in the list of auth services

9. it actually not being Jitsi Meet's obligation at all and authorities continue to prosecute the criminal action of the participants by doing actual investigations

10. ...

4. costs money and work for a free service

5. makes the service cost money

6. costs money to pull off (and/or makes the service cost money)

7. simple to pull off, yes. Uncertain how big the benefit really is.

8. If Apple permits that, that seems a sensible request in general. Doesn't solve the general issue since it's the same kind of megacorp as all the others.

9. that's the ideal case, and since they're operating from the US (Delaware company etc) might actually work. Might still bear the cost of every random county sheriff giving them a stern talking-to because they can't offer data during those investigations.

10. not an option at all.

So out of your 7 given options, only one (#7) is reasonably simple to implement with a potential benefit (do they need to block all the popular VPN services, too?)

It seems like your actual opinion is #9, but that's not actually a solution they can implement.

because chronic deflectors were pretending that the only people that can question one solution must also be the person to have the other solution

Is MFA the only solution to the auth problem? No.

Is having a firewall the only way to prevent unauthorized traffic on your network? No.

Is docker the only solution to how to package software in containers? No

Is git the only DVCS? No.

Is git-flow the only way to manage branching and pull-requests? No.

Is Rust/Python/Javascript the only programming language? No.

Are relational databases the only way to persist important data? No.

etc etc etc...

We normally expect for difficult problems to have a variety of solutions with different tradeoffs and in particular, for really hard problems involving adaptive human adversaries, a lot of time we rely on applying multiple levels of "solution" in order to give us defense in depth and a chance to really crack a particular problem.

when without that rumor the criticism of the change would be criticism

“is this the only solution” is actually just me being diplomatic on a topic people are emotional about, as its clearly not the only solution, but even that is met with deflection

maybe thats the reason this “weird standard” is only noticed on CSAM mitigation discussions, because people know they cant be frank to you

Its “is this the least worst solution, or the most best, and why?”

I started off with a very cordial question, and you were the one that found the mere question to be absurd. if you cant engage then take your own advice, its an option

What this seems to be aiming at is having somebody who's responsible in case any given meeting ends up being investigated.

"No login" doesn't offer any clue (besides an IP address, perhaps). "Enter your name" will see tons of Donald Ducks doing video conferences. "Enter any valid email address" (+ confirmation) will see tons of throw-away domains not paid for by stolen credit card data. Same for OpenID etc.

OAuth from Meta, Alphabet or Microsoft offloads that problem to megacorps with the resources to handle that question, and they do for their own anti-spam purposes: For example with that phone number verification step when creating a new account.

So that's the benchmark that any alternatives compete with.

Jitsi could start its own user database and do an SMS handshake for room-creation permissions - which means they'll have to deal with global SMS, associating a phone number with each meeting while protecting that data (the OAuth identifiers are relatively harmless since they're unique for each OAuth consumer).

That's a steep increase in costs and responsibilities for a service they provide for free...

If they still wish to do any sort of reporting or eavesdropping on content, something they claim to be specifically impossible, yet somehow they've unearthed, that is their perogative I suppose.

Personally, I think <insert law enforcement authority> of some sort has made rumblings or threats about them daring to run an uneavesdroppable open comms service, so once again, nice things cannot be had, and everyone is happy to torch the ability to low-frictionly connect between arbitrary people because of the CSAM boogeyman, which no evidence has been brought forth to assert the existence of. In fact, there's been no evidence brought forth that there is any sort of worthwhile reason other than "Jitsi wants in on monetizing user's contact meta info".