I think you fail to realize that the internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls. When "fixing" a router means you break half the internet, you just don't fix it. This isn't some walled garden where you can just say "tough shit if you broke, fix it".
Most of the "issues" these researchers find are well known, but backbone operators are more militant than Linus when it comes to: rule #1 is don't break user space.
The internet is a bunch of disparate networks that no one person controls, exactly. That means that when someone tells you there's a fault in the kit that you have installed in your network, then that is 100% your problem and it is 100% on you to get it fixed. Once a vulnerability is known then someone out there is going to start exploiting it almost immediately.
> backbone operators are more militant than Linus when it comes to: rule #1 is don't break user space.
Backbone operators can have all the hubris they want, but it won't change the reality that the only effective action they can take when a vulnerability is found is to get it fixed ASAP. This is a security lesson that has been learnt in recent years by many sectors of the IT industry and, judging by the woeful response that Ben Cartwright-Cox describes in his post, it's one that the network backbone is going to be learning soon.
So you've never worked in a corporate environment. Here's how that conversation would go:
Hey guys, some researchers found out if you use a test flag meant for the lab on the public internet, it breaks all our BGP sessions.
OK, so drop their feed and block them?
Great, done.
>Once a vulnerability is known then someone out there is going to start exploiting it almost immediately.
And yet the "vulnerability" in question was known, and was not being immediately exploited if you read through the mailing list or were participating in NANOG at that point in time. So your statement is provably false.
>Backbone operators can have all the hubris they want, but it won't change the reality that the only effective action they can take when a vulnerability is found is to get it fixed ASAP.
And yet we're having this conversation in 2023, they have operated the same way for 40+ years, and somehow the internet is still working. Bad actors get blackholed, it worked in the past, it'll continue working in the future. The reality is that backbone routing is expensive, and expecting everyone to update their kit on YOUR timeline isn't reasonable.
I am prophesying that a similar reckoning is likely to come upon the network backbone. You're arguing that the cost of entry to the game (BGP peering) is such that the old ways will continue to work. Let's hope you're right.
Practically, I accept that there is a real difference. ASNs are much harder to acquire than IP addresses, and there are far fewer of them. That difference might mean that blocking continues to be an effective mechanism. However, in a world where malicious actors are increasingly just nation states wearing a flimsy mask, I'm not sure that the difficulty of getting access to sufficient numbers of ASNs is going to be a forever mitigation.
The main thing I have taken away from this thread is that when it comes to vulnerability management, network operators seem to be pretty far behind the curve in mindset terms. The arguments being made in here ("you can't break other people's stuff", "we have a lot of boxes and SLAs mean we can't patch quickly") aren't even slightly new. The well-proven reality is that threat actors don't give one single shit about any of that.
> Great, done.
The "great" is the problem, no?
Bearing in mind we also couldn't just "apt-get upgrade" in place, most boxes required hard reboots to apply the patches.
The answer to your question is no, as per a few others have said, Don't violate Rule #1. We see bad actors very often, our job is to keep the bits flowing and the internet online.
Keeping the internet online is painful enough as it is without "researchers" dropping thousands of routers to "prove a point."
Research is great but if you're poking around breaking things via DoS in the internet you're going to be judged as a bad peer regardless what the route daemon does. The security of the internet constantly moves forward but that doesn't mean the expectation of improving has to hold more precedence than the expectation of running. It's still very much a human to human system for all but the actual route exchange.
We call out vendors when their quality suffers but you only have two or three practical vendor options for high end routers depending on your use case/feature requirements. All three have varying cycles of hardware and software quality, with hardware and software rarely being in phase for the same vendor.
The fact that all three vendors make most of their money on non-network focused enterprises with less sophisticated engineers doesn't help get development attention where it needs to be for global infrastructure.
Bitching at researchers (note: not "researchers") who are finding and calling out those flaws before someone really bad comes along and exploits them is somewhere between unhelpful and negligent. Internet security is always improved by more sunlight.