BIMI is worthless. It's a carrot to get your marketing department on board with setting up DMARC because they are the most likely to push back due to fears of the project affecting their email deliverability. You have to fully deploy DMARC to setup BIMI.
Now, BIMI and the costs to "verify" your mark is pushed by exactly the same people who tried to sell you extended validation SSL that would turn your browser address bar green when you visited a site that had gone through this verification.
Just like with EV SSL, BIMI has no positive impact on user security. They're just as likely to open / not open an email with BIMI as they are to visit a site with or without EV SSL. In some cases, it's actually worse.
The only benefit to BIMI is it gives you another place for the marketing department to stick the logo so they'll stop fighting the DMARC rollout. That's it. Otherwise it's total waste of money and time.
Wrote about it here: https://www.brightball.com/articles/enterprise-challenges-wi...
DMARC roll-out in itself could also attract the marketing department because it improves deliverability under the hood. I also think implementing SPF, DKIM and DMARC can be done without compromising availability by planning and monitoring well.
> To ensure that logos are actually truly representative of the brand involved, and more cynically, to make money and penalize small senders, an optional Verified Mark Certificate can be added to the DNS records, which some mailboxes will validate before showing the logo.
> Unfortunately VMC certificates cost upwards of $1000 USD to purchase. Which puts them out of reach for casual or small senders (of which we are big supporters here at MailPace), and undermines the BIMI effort overall.
There was also this which showed up a month after Google started their rollout of the BIMI checkmark: https://twitter.com/chrisplummer/status/1664075886545575941
Plus nobody significant really follows/uses DANE, because how shit DNSSEC is.
It seems to also have learned from one of Extended Certificate's shortcomings by relying on trademark instead of company name. I actually wish something similar was created to replace EV certificates as it's easier than ever to perform phishing attacks now that everyone and their grandmas has a DV certificate on their site (which is a good thing).
Phishers won't be applying for trademarks to impersonate Apple.
“Expensive” is very subjective, I think it highly depends on the financial standard of the actor and the expected value.
In the case of Apple: if it is expected to aid in phishing an interesting iCloud user, or scamming 100 users for 10$, then I expect that there will be actors that will pay this initial cost to make more later on.
I agree that the classic mass-mail LQ phish actors would probably not go here, but the same holds for smaller organizations. With the current price-tag, end users then still have to trust non-BIMI and BIMI verified e-mails daily.
That seems to leave plenty room for phishing. Also, if VMC prices drop, it will also attract more phish actors.
Though I see your point, I do not think that a financial bar is effectively combatting phishing.
I do not know how valid the paper trail concern is; I haven’t gone through the VMC procedure(s).
> I do not know how valid the paper trail concern is; I haven’t gone through the VMC procedure(s).
You can currently steal a credit card, lie to a registrar and start your phishing campaign. Having to have a legal entity for a phish paints a nice target on your back.
Would it be possible to register a trademark that looks similar to another company’s and impersonate them? I can’t imagine the process would be 100% effective.
Sure the company would probably notice pretty quickly, but not before you’ve spear phished a couple clients.
It is annoyingly expensive, but I'm expecting it to change with additional CAs entering the market. Very "EV" vibes though, but it is literally for that, so.
End users might also appreciate something nicer than autogenerated one-letter icons. Matter of taste.
It also makes phish stand out more than usual, if the user has grown accustomed. We'll see its efficacy long-term though, too early to say.
The $1000 certificate makes it unusable for anyone but the most annoying marketeers, though. Any EV certificate would've worked to serve the "business verified by a trusted third party" requirement, but CAs being CAs, they had to invent a new certificate for business reasons.
The process is further complicated by leaving it open to recipient servers whether or not they actually trust you after buying the special certificate. This does make sense for the small number of companies actually using BIMI, but it does hurt the scalability of the solution.
The only people who benefit from BIMI are the ones selling the quite expensive certificates.
I’m wondering if it is worth it for most medium-large organization or if this is specifically worth it if you are doing a lot of commerce and sending e-mails to customers etc.
Furthermore, (stating the obvious) DKIM, SPF and DMARC are also implemented by malicious parties and only authenticate that the server was allowed to send using a particular domain name. BIMI seems to require a VMC (Verified Mark Certificate). Is this verified and is it effective in preventing unauthorized parties from BIMI verifying their domains using stolen brand logo’s etc.
Also, is Microsoft Outlook (still) not supporting/adopting BIMI?