Go to https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate and select some regions, see for yourself. Africa as a whole has declining fertility rates. Even if you look a high-growth countries such as Niger or Democratic Republic of Congo, the fertility rate has been declining in the last 20-30 years, and you'll be hard-pressed to find a country where it has gone up.
Maybe we could buttress them by all the 4x to 10x productivity gains that automation has brought us. [1] Maybe we could cut back on all the useless, extraneous, low-to-negative ROI shit we're doing. We have options, here, that don't require a population ponzi scheme.
(Also, you can't be blaming this situation in China on demographic collapse, when it allegedly has massive youth unemployment.)
[1] Remember, just a few decades, when somehow, a single working adult could comfortably provide for a whole family? Why can't he, anymore? What has changed? We are more productive per worker, we have more workers participating in the economy, but somehow, you think we can't provide for everyone.
If the expectation for quality of life for the vast majority is living off of 1 income household, then that is an acceptable quality of life. If that expectation for the vast majority changes to quality of life by living off of 2 income households, then a quality of life from a 1 income household is no longer sufficient.
Also, expectations of work itself change. It could be possible that a sufficiently large portion of the population is simply unwilling to change bedpans for a price close to what old people themselves can afford (even if the cost is implicit from getting services from a family member). In this case, it becomes a political issue of how to allocate labor, i.e. who to tax, how much to tax them, and who gets the benefits of government spending.
[1] - https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2021/10/2...
In Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century, he argues that the period you're talking about is an anomaly historically due to the postwar boom of an unscathed US, that many people take as the historical norm due to recency bias; no one alive today was alive in the 1800s or earlier to see just how unequal life among the poor and rich was. He argues that this inequality is the norm rather than the exception for what is happening today.
I find the consumer price index 1775-2012 quite interesting. It's really easy to see how nearly everything listed there could be directly, and very likely causally, linked to giving the US government the power to start printing tens of trillions of dollars. Because that money invariably makes it to the most well off in society, even on the rare instance when it starts somewhat lower. If not one has to come up with an alternative explanation for what happened at that time, because it's like in 1971 that were just a button pressed saying, "start destroying socioeconomic stability."
https://www.prb.org/resources/did-south-koreas-population-po...
It's so odd to me that of the many issues people freak out about, this one ranks relatively low. We're looking at a non-speculative and entirely real demographic collapse of the entire developed world, in quite rapid order. For those who may not appreciate the impact, a total fertility rate of "N" means you will trend towards a system where the population of one older generation will be "2/N" times larger than the next younger generation.
So if you have a fertility rate of 2, each generation will be exactly the same. If you have a fertility rate of 1 then each older generation will be exactly twice as large as the next younger generation. So, for a simple model, imagine we all gave birth at 20. You'd trend towards a population distribution of 16 80-year-olds, 8 60-year-olds, 4 40-year-olds, 2 20-year-olds, 1 newborn. Systems of social security, healthcare, and the general economy will just collapse under that sort of pressure.
[1] - https://www.statista.com/statistics/241530/birth-rate-by-fam...