News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Terminal scrollback written to local disk, including remo... by rlpb on Wednesday March 07, 2012 @09:29AM (#3675575)
This is why full disk encryption is useful (as opposed to, say, just encrypting /home). Unexpected data leaks will often remain encrypted.

Edit: added "often"

Re:Terminal scrollback written to local disk, including remo... by dfc on Wednesday March 07, 2012 @03:53PM (#3677162)
I agree with you but to be precise full disk encryption does not provide any benefit that is not met by encrypting user writeable mounts. Encrypting /usr, /bin, /lib etc does nothing in this situation.
Re:Terminal scrollback written to local disk, including remo... by rlpb on Thursday March 08, 2012 @07:54AM (#3679538)
The point is to catch the unexpected, just as this scenario was unexpected.

I can't think of a realistic situation right now that will catch you out, but with full disk encryption I don't have to.

Re:Terminal scrollback written to local disk, including remo... by accountoftheday on Wednesday March 07, 2012 @05:13PM (#3677530)
Full disk encryption provides some level of protection against backdooring.
Re:Terminal scrollback written to local disk, including remo... by dfc on Wednesday March 07, 2012 @05:15PM (#3677536)
Under what threat model? (Backdooring is also beyond the scope of the initial doiscussion)