DNS-01 attacks are by default similarly vulnerable to MitM between the issuer and your DNS server, which can be mitigated by setting up DNSSEC.
[0]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8657
[1]: https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/prod-support-for-rfc8657...
You would have to be forced to install an extra root certificate that allows the ISP to MITM your traffic, or have a CA turn rogue and start issuing certificates for other people (e.g. DigiNotar). Both of these attacks would be detected by the Certificate Transparency system, so everyone would know. And for very big domains (google/facebook) browsers pre-bundle the certs they expect to see and refuse to honour any other cert, this is known as static key pinning.
Nation states would be more likely to just tap up Cloudflare to spy on the traffic since a huge % of the internet goes directly to them and is unencrypted at that point.
You can tell it's not true, because if MITM certs signed by trusted root CAs were being issued, they'd appear in Certificate Transparency logs.
Although mis-issued certificates have happened [1] it is very rare, and convincing a root CA to intentionally issue you such a certificate would be very, very far from trivial.
[1] https://www.computerworld.com/article/2714719/rogue-google-s...
Seriously? Just like that? You can pretend that you are a random site.com and get a SSL lock icon in 2023 if you are big enough?