For example many banks in the US use security questions to identify a user/device on first run. In europe they use randomized keycards. Once this has been completed the device stores a nonce to identify the device across multiple sessions. If you ever kill your nonce you have to repeat first time authentication.
Now granted this works, and many people might feel this is good enough, but I agree with the author that client certs would work better for identifying users then the current solutions.
And one wonders why no one wants to do this stuff.
This is poor analysis. You're arguing from an incomplete position. The choice isn't between "some security" (mobile certs) and "best security" (forced reauthentication). It's between "bad security" (multiple accounts with shared passwords) and "better security" (single cloud account with escrowed access to the cert).
They don't use client certs, though, and I have no knowledge on the private banks.
A user moving to a new browser has to identify himself as the real user, thus requiring some sort of authentication. It's a chicken and egg thing.
Someone needs to do this in the browser. You'd need to put a (escrowed!) keyphrase on the cert, back it up to the cloud securely, associate it with the user's account in such a way that they can get to it. And then enough browsers need to support it to make it worthwhile. That's a tall order.