Re:DNSSEC failures are how you get people to disable DNSSEC
by mike_hearn on Friday June 02, 2023 @05:47AM
(#36163129)
Yes. It seems there's some thinking around doing offline validation for DNSSEC as part of DANE, so you'd get the proofs you need from DNSSEC on the server side, then combine those with a certificate and send that to TLS clients. That seems reasonable.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:DNSSEC failures are how you get people to disable DNSSEC
by tptacek on Friday June 02, 2023 @10:41AM
(#36165739)
There was an effort to staple DANE proofs to TLS handshakes, but it failed: if you could suborn a CA, you could control the TLS handshake enough to stripe the DANE proofs out, and the whole point of the DANE proofs was to avoid trusting CAs.
Re:DNSSEC failures are how you get people to disable DNSSEC
by mike_hearn on Friday June 02, 2023 @11:37AM
(#36166592)
Catch 22. To know the server wants to exclusively use DANE you must learn that in a secure way, like via DNSSEC, but the point of DANE is to not do interactive DNSSEC queries.
I guess if you're publishing an intent to use DANE stapling exclusively via DNS, then you could have tools that crawl the CT logs looking for CA issuances for domains that claim they don't want them. Though maybe detecting an attack in that way isn't worth much.