Mozilla to Certificate Authorities: no subordinate CAs for traffic interception

Re:Mozilla to Certificate Authorities: no subordinate CAs fo... by zokier on Saturday February 18, 2012 @03:06AM (#3606209)

So did they decide what to do with the TrustWave-case? Are they forgiven for their confession? That seems to be the implication of this announcement.

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Re:Mozilla to Certificate Authorities: no subordinate CAs fo... by joshtalon on Saturday February 18, 2012 @03:17AM (#3606230)

Makes you wonder what actually happened with TrustWave (there's obviously more to it than "Oh, this was an ethical dilemma so we stopped."). Probably their customer found a way into the intermediate CA private key and was being naughty with it.

What I think sparked Mozilla is TrustWave's claim that this kind of thing is widespread and commonplace among CA's. That's shouldn't surprise anyone, though.

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