/s maybe
More generally, it’s extremely desirable to give an agent privileges that can be misused (weird as that sounds). The alternatives are to authorize every individual action or perfectly define the boundaries of what’s allowed. Both of these are error prone and time consuming.
addTodoItem(taintedLLMtranslation, untaintedOriginalEmailAddress)
As for summaries, don’t allow that output to make API calls or be eval’d! Sure, it might be in pig latin from a prompt injection but it won’t be executing arbitrary code or even making API calls to delete Todo items.All of the data that came from remote commands, such as the body of a newly created Todo item, should still be considered tainted and and treated in a similar manner.
These are the exact same security issues for any case of remote API calls with arbitrary execution.
Here’s an example of what I mean:
https://github.com/williamcotton/transynthetical-engine#brow...
By keeping the main discourse between the user and the LLM from containing all of the generated code and instead just using that main “thread” to orchestrate instructions to write code it allows for more back-and-forth.
It’s a good technique in general!
I’m still too paranoid to execute instructions via email without a very limited set of abilities!
Why not just have a limited set of permissions for what commands can originate from a given email address?
The original email address can be included along with whatever commands were translated by the LLM. It seems easy enough to limit that to only a few simple commands like “create todo item”.
Think of it this way, what commands would you be fine to be run on your computer if they came from a given email address?