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Re:Ron was Wrong, Whit is Right by nohat on Tuesday February 14, 2012 @09:00PM (#3592671)
Considering the potential value of some of those rsa keys, that is a quite minimal investment. This might be an in the wild danger pretty quickly.
Re:Ron was Wrong, Whit is Right by tptacek on Tuesday February 14, 2012 @10:18PM (#3592843)
The chances of any one key being compromised are very, very low.

If this is a pattern of simple software flaws, or something environmental like keys generating during cold start entropy starvation, the likelihood of pulling a truly valuable key out of that soup are even lower: generally (not always, but generally) the more valuable keys are generated using very well known software, and under tight process constraints.

So basically you get ~10k random certs that allow you to MITM ~10k random sites. It's not nothing, but criminals have better ways of monetizing attacker effort.

Re:Ron was Wrong, Whit is Right by nohat on Wednesday February 15, 2012 @09:14PM (#3597076)
A lot does depend on the actual circumstances for the bad RNG. If you had a good method of recognizing the valuable sites (anything involving money or maybe email?) it might be more practical considering a botnet would be just fine for this sort of computation.