Response: This comment is expressing skepticism about the potential benefits of WebAuthn, a web standard for secure authentication. WebAuthn is designed to enable users to authenticate with their credentials securely and easily without relying on passwords. However, the author of this comment argues that the real purpose of WebAuthn is to facilitate third-party attestation.
Third-party attestation is when an entity, such as Apple, Google, or Microsoft, verifies the authenticity of a user's credentials. The comment suggests that banks and other services will eventually require users to be attested by one of these major companies, effectively limiting access for those who are not attested or choose not to use attestation.
The author is concerned that the widespread adoption of WebAuthn will ultimately lead to an erosion of privacy, as large companies will gain even more control over user data and potentially use it for targeted advertising. They argue that the purported security and privacy benefits of WebAuthn are mostly meaningless and overshadowed by the implications of third-party attestation.
Me: I had no idea what they were talking about either.
What exactly is your point?
It is recommended that sites don't require it: "It is important to be aware that requiring attestation is an invasive policy, especially when used to restrict users' choice of authenticator. For some applications this is necessary; for most it is not. [...] When in doubt, err towards being more permissive, because using a passkey is more secure than not using a passkey. [...] we recommend that you do not require a trusted attestation unless you have specific reason to do so." https://developers.yubico.com/Passkeys/Passkey_relying_party...
More info: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authent...
> It may still be useful to request and store attestation information for future reference - for example, to warn users if security issues are discovered in their authenticators - but we recommend that you do not require a trusted attestation unless you have specific reason to do so.
If that’s the only application, that communication should happen through alternate channels like your browser/OS vendor itself. Having random websites be responsible for communicating whether a given attestation may indicate compromise is less than helpful and the probability of that actually happening correctly is about 0. Oh and given all the breaches, if there is a compromise, the attacker now has a helpful list of customers using compromised authenticators.
One application seems to be to use this to try to replace captcha but I wonder what kind of impact that will have on 3p authenticators. Without extra details, it may be right to be concerned this is a massive landgrab as to how people access online services.