Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password
by XorNot on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @05:26PM
(#35808018)
If a common browser protocol required the password to be salted with an application supplied value and then rehashed with the domain name it's served on, there'd be no way to phish a password.
The value the user's browser sends back can't be reversed, so any website prompting from the wrong domain would only ever see an incorrect hash, rather then the cleartext as it does now.
Programs such as Bitwarden already do this, where you send the hash of your password to the server instead of the password itself, because from the password you derive the decryption key and you never want that reaching the server. You then use that hashed password as the authorization password, but the client uses the actual password to decrypt the delivered password vault.