Re:AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defea...
by cryptonector on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:23AM
(#35797987)
There isn't that much that I'd do in a TPM 3.0:
- encrypt all command and response parameters instead of up to just one
- add a version of TPM2_Quote() that encrypts and signs so one can have ciphertext that one can demonstrate were made by a TPM encrypting to a restricted, shielded key
- add a small secure enclave facility
- add more EC algorithms, EdDSA, etc.
- add more cipher modes for AES
- increase RAM and NVRAM requirements
All of this can be done incrementally in 2.x, so calling it 3.0 would be just marketing (perhaps pretty good marketing).
- encrypt all command and response parameters instead of up to just one
- add a version of TPM2_Quote() that encrypts and signs so one can have ciphertext that one can demonstrate were made by a TPM encrypting to a restricted, shielded key
- add a small secure enclave facility
- add more EC algorithms, EdDSA, etc.
- add more cipher modes for AES
- increase RAM and NVRAM requirements
All of this can be done incrementally in 2.x, so calling it 3.0 would be just marketing (perhaps pretty good marketing).