AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defeating Disk Encryption

Re:AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defea... by als0 on Tuesday May 02, 2023 @12:26PM (#35790037)

It's worth mentioning that standalone TPM chips from Infineon and others are a lot more hardened than Intel or AMD's fTPMs. Infineon's TPMs are tested against fault injection attack, package removal, side channels and so on.

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Re:AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defea... by cwerling on Tuesday May 02, 2023 @12:33PM (#35790163)

Please note, though, that's imperative to then go for a BitLocker TPM+PIN configuration at least. A standalone (discrete) TPM with TPM-only protectors can be attacked by bus sniffing, a hardware attack much simpler than ours. [1]

The beauty of a discrete TPM is its anti-hammering protection, making a numerical PIN a very effective security measure (akin to a SIM/SmartCard).

[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089812211...

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Re:AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defea... by als0 on Tuesday May 02, 2023 @02:54PM (#35792426)

Bus sniffing can be mitigated by encrypting communications using the TPM's in-built parameter encryption capabilities.

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Re:AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defea... by cryptonector on Tuesday May 02, 2023 @06:02PM (#35794839)

Yes, this. Bitlocker could absolutely do this.

There's still other active attacks resulting from the BMC and BIOS and parts of the OS not also doing the encrypted session thing.

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