In EU you can get to a lot of destinations for much less than 100€. And I bet EU regulations are not less stringent than US. Adding insult to injury, Airbus does fine smashing Boeing in the mid-range mid-size planes segment.
Maybe the problem is not in the regulations, but in Boeing? Which tries to circumvent the regulations, instead of following them, or at least trying to appeal the regulations in a legal way?
There's a lot of cheap destinations for domestic US flights, too. And the average length of a flight in the US is longer, obviously.
Not really. For US in 2018 it was ~700 miles (https://www.bts.dot.gov/newsroom/2018-traffic-data-us-airlin...), and for EU in 2020 it was ~1000 kilometers (https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/2021-04/euro...).
There are a lot of short flights (anything not coast-to-coast or north-to-south, basically) that skew the average.
700 miles is around 1127 kilometers... which I'm sure you knew and were just highlighting that US flights ain't that much longer than EU flights on average, but it's worth noting for clarity that they are indeed longer.
Even renting the smallest of single-engine aircraft as a student pilot is beyond the resources of what most people would spend (hundreds of dollars per hour) "for fun". Owning an aircraft is out of reach for all but the very wealthy.
A small airplane is no more technically sophisticated than an automobile, yet costs orders of magnitude more.
I’m inclined to believe that even if the engine components are the same, the whole control mechanism is an order of magnitude more complex than a car.
There are some factory tour videos on Rotax factory somewhere
The main difference you will notice first in the controls is that they all still require the operator to manually control fuel mixture. Cars used to be that way too.
But having a carburetor with a manually controlled fuel inlet valve opens the door to the operator getting it wrong and running the engine either too rich or too lean, which can lead to pre-detonation and/or build up of carbon deposits in the cylinders and on the spark plugs. Both of which throw off the engine timing, wear out engine components faster, and can lead to blowing up the engine or sudden loss of power during flight. And that's on top of the possibility that the venturi can freeze up, starving the engine of fuel and air on decent, even on a hot day outside. Which means the pilot also has to learn to use "carb heat" which is an inefficient solution that sends hot exhaust gas back through the carburetor.
The controls are just two levers, nothing complicated, but the ways one can mess that up are varied. They are also subtle mistakes, right up until you are suddenly losing power at the worst time.
The answer in the car world has been to switch to fuel injectors with computer monitoring and control.
However, even introducing FADEC systems has been a struggle in aviation, LONG after they were well proven in ground vehicles.
As a result, operating just the engine in a small GA plane is harder and more error prone than operating a car engine and the aviation world responds to that increased risk by adding even more regulation around maintenance requirements and overhaul times. Which sounds perfectly rational but there is little data behind the regulations compared to what we could have if most engines were computer controlled and monitored. And we wouldn't need to be so paranoid on maintenance hours if we could rely on issues being noticed before they become problems.
Additionally, this makes flying with those more basic engines a bigger risk because the pilot then has to know the sounds, vibrational patterns, and general "feel" of that particular engine in order to have a good chance at detecting any issues that might lead to a loss of power. But as we humans are well aware from experience making car engines, this is not good enough, there are hundreds of little bits if information that can be indications of the beginnings of an eventual and costly failure that, if noticed early and remedied at the shop, results in continued and more reliable operation.
We start out cars every day and drive to work without really even thinking about the engines. The computers have our backs there. And the vast majority of the time, if anything, the computers are a bit TOO paranoid. But that's a good thing because it means problems get fixed before you end up broke down on the side of the road.
It is even more important that the engine not fail suddenly in flight because then you are forced to land where ever you can, even if that's a farmer's field. Very dangerous for the people in the plane and somewhat dangerous for people on the ground too.
One would think that the importance of detecting issues BEFORE takeoff and as early as possible during a flight, before the engine actually starts losing power, would make us want to use every tool at our disposal to operate, monitor, and maintain those engines as best as possible. But this is not the case, largely due to the way in which aircraft engine manufacturing and certification are regulated.
It's not cheap, but it's not unfathomably expensive either. I would guess within reach for about half the US folk on here - based on the assumption that that population heavily skews to high-paying tech roles.
Which is also a problem because weather changes during flight. So if you actually want to travel with a plane you rented, you're going to need an instrument rating, which costs about as much as the initial license.
So you're out the price of a new mid-tier sedan, which you had to pay in cash upfront, and all you have to show for it is a card that says you can rent someone else's plane to go somewhere, AFTER they make you do a check ride with one of their local instructors anyway. You'll also then be renting the even more expensive IFR rated planes.
Software people are well paid enough to do all this, yes. So are lawyers and doctors. But that amounts to around 1% or less of the US population.
Boeing blamed the crashes on the lack of pilot training.
> “The crew’s inadequate actions … played a role in the chain of events that led to the accident, in particular during the first phase of the flight, before the first MCAS activation,” the BEA wrote. Both agencies suggest that Ethiopian Airlines *failed to ensure its pilots were adequately trained* in the measures that Boeing recommended to counter an erroneous MCAS activation after the first MAX crash.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/final...
https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/boeing_read...
https://services.boeing.com/training-solutions/flight-traini...
"Pilot Error" is the most favored scapegoat in the aviation industry. It's always possible to say the problem occurred between "the keyboard and the floor", to use the analogous software catch phrase.
But that isn't good enough when the systems are supposed to be designed for trained humans to operation without making such errors. If operating the system is error prone, change the system.
In this case in particular, if the pilots were not trained well enough that was due to the fact that Boeing's initial training materials were inadequate.
I know that article wants to push the narrative that those pilots in particular were not good enough pilots to begin with, but that was not true before they flew the Max8. Flying the Max8 is what got them killed. Kinda weird that they had this supposedly inadequate skill set all along but it was only a deadly issue with the brand new plane. It may indeed be that Ethiopia needs to up their training discipline. And that's good to address. But it does nothing to absolve Boeing's part in those crashes.
https://www.businessinsider.com/boeings-ceo-on-why-737-max-p...
The FAA and Boeing have now established the new training requirements that should have been there from the start.
> "3. HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGE The purpose of this revision is to add training requirements for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS) enhancements, and additional Special Emphasis Training. Appendices 2 and 3 reflect applicable table updates from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8 and from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-800. Appendix 7 was added to delineate ground and flight training necessary to operate the 737 MAX modified with Flight Control Computer (FCC) software version P12.1.2."
Post incident Boeing is doing some double speaking for PR and CYA. But the investigation already proved out that they were dodging the training updates so they could get the plane to market sooner. And two things can be true at the same time as well. Accident investigations are meant to uncover ALL of the systemic and specific failures that led to the crash. And that's a really good thing.
But again, everything thing the did was to avoid costly extended certification requirements for the planes and time consuming re-certification of pilots.
If regulations are leading to this kind of behavior, it's not enough to even blame just Boeing. We need to make the right thing to do, the easiest thing to do. Maybe that's not possible here, but I don't really see anyone trying.
It’s not impossible.
Now of course what Boeing did to block Bombardier didn't help* and more or less sealed Bombardier's faith. But that was only because Bombardier at that point was basically on the verge of death and had only a few months left of runway (ha), which is crazy for a formerly massive and diversified player.
* and our government here in Canada is so weak (nothing specific to Trudeau here, the same could be said about Nortel or tons of other high tech that have been squandered in Canadian history ) that it didn't want to support bombardier more than it did.
300% import duty, was it? Free market for me but not for thee?
What killed C-Series was Boeings shenanigans about 300% import duty. Abusing US laws for sure, but nothing to do with FAA killing it.
The plane was ready, so they had already done it. So whatever you say about not being impossible is directly contradicted.
Would Bombardier have made it with a more cooperative FAA? Maybe. Same question could also be asked about whether a different airline industry in the US would have helped. We don't know and never will.
In general tho, I am not arguing against the overarching point of your original comment, regulations tend to come in and it rarely happens that they are being refactored or cleaned up.
A lot of paper is being pushed around and rigidly enforced without looking at the big picture. The friction of complexity I guess.
But the specific claim, even though it sounds about right is not strictly correct.
I do not accept this at all.
This would not result in "US producing no commercial aircraft". Boeing has a healthy and growing profit margin. They can afford to vertify a new plane properly.
You are asking me to risk my life to pad their margins.
it is exactly this king of preferential treatment to big players that ensures that there wont be competition.
The only way to rise is to have a full backing of a economkc superpower, basically Eu/US/China
They didn’t do it because of comercial reasons aka money in their pockets. Airlines were happy not having to do more training, they were happy, stock holders were happy, everyone was happy!
The regulations are so heavy and complicated that the best path to profit is to just capture and manipulate the regulators. Which only the biggest power players can do.
So there is effectively no competition allowed here. That doesn't serve the public well at all. We should like to see a market where many more new aircraft companies are popping up with new designs to prove out. Safety as a top concern, yes, but also a path to profit that doesn't have to involve cheating the system.
That's not a healthy market and it is definitely suppressing advancement and discovery of new technology that we would all benefit from. What we should like to see is a market where safety is maximized AND it is possible to start a new aviation company with a reasonable chance of success.
The public is not well served by the current regulation environment. It looks like maximum safety concern, but we don't even get to know how safe and efficient flying could be if the tech was actually moving forward at a reasonable pace.
It took forever to even get winglets on most of the big aircraft. We knew about winglets in 1897.
Yes, manipulating regulators does not create safety. If there are monetary fines and prison for those who approved the designs and testing, the corner-cutting would cease.
The 737MAX benefit was better fuel economy due to larger fans. Shortcuts were taken, and FAA and the flying public don't care to force a new type certification.
Both cases are absurdly expensive and time consuming to the point that any new aircraft designs are basically experimental or dead on paper in terms of being able to sell the plane at a price people or even companies can actually pay.
In this case, my understanding is that, the new engines are a bit bigger which necessitated a change in mounting position relative to the main body in order to maintain ground clearance on takeoff and landing, this should have meant larger landing gear sitting a bit higher and/or a slightly different wing shape and mounting position on the body.
However, any of those kind of changes would have moved the Max8 into a new type certificate which would then require all pilots flying it to certify on that type in addition to additional flight testing and manufacturing certifications. All of that would move the cost of the plane well above the point where the efficiency gains would make it worth buying and delay production to the point where there would no longer be a market for it. So there would simply be no Max8.
And one could say, "well that's business, Airbus beat you to it, Boeing should lose then". And that would be fine as long as we're willing to accept a world where the US produces no commercial aircraft at all and airline ticket prices and accommodations continue to get even worse. Are we good with making travel by air something only the rich can afford?
So Boeing went with extending the engines forward and slightly upward which necessitated more down force from the horizontal stabilizers to balance the increased weight forward of the center of lift and introduced a potential disruption of airflow over the wings in a high pitch up situation.
Changing the size, shape, or position of the horizontal stabilizers or anything else that would address the airflow issues would also run into certification cost issues. Therefore Boeing settled on an active control solution which they integrated into the existing flight control software (poorly) and found creative ways to convince regulators that nothing much had changed in the software such that the whole design could be built at a price point and time to market that would actually make the project worth doing at all.
This kind of creative engineering of what you can get past the regulators is the dark side of any over-regulated industry and continues even in the re-certification process for the Max8 https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/18/22189609/faa-boeing-737-...
The reasons for it are pretty straight forward and can be seen as bad actors being bad or simply the result you are bound to get when you regulate without accounting for the reality of how people and businesses work. You can't just say "safety is our top priority" and continue to add layers of regulation until it's impossible to do anything without manipulating or bypassing those regulations. Doing so will counter-productively NOT get you safer designs.
What it will reliably get you is a shift in the focus of efforts from engineering the safest and most efficient aircraft possible to getting ever more creative about designing things you can get past the regulators. You don't want smart people dedicating large amounts of time, energy, and money to efforts to manipulate regulators.
We the public would be much better served by an FAA that regulates with safety as the top priority AND an eye for making it possible and profitable to actually introduce new designs and new ways to manufacture things.
Right now it is simply impossible to start a company with the goal of introducing a new aircraft or aircraft engine to the US market. It costs astronomical amounts to get to the point where you can sell your first plane and separately astronomical amounts to get to where you can sell your first engine. Even for single engine, fixed gear, small and light, GA planes.
This is why almost no normal US citizen can afford to fly personally, even just occasionally for fun. It is also why GA planes still use leaded gasoline and burn around 10 gallons per hour. It is also why "new" aircraft are all actually >95% similar to existing designs (even if that makes them inefficient), always use existing decades old engines, and still cost hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars, making them priced out for all but the wealthiest potential customers.
The only possible route for any innovation in flight has been Experimental airworthiness certificates. And you can sell a few planes that way; but once you have a known good and tested design, you are still stuck in the Experimental category indefinitely because you will never sell enough planes to afford a standard category certificate.
Best of luck to the flying car startups but no pilot in the US expects them to have a snowball's chance in hell of making it to the point where they are profitably selling a genuinely new type of aircraft.