I wonder how many inches/feet we're talking here? The hardware on the top (unless it experienced electrical short) is most likely fine?
"Servers are down, I'll head over to the DC" turned into "Um... it's raining _in the DC_. Get me some tarps and get us cut over to the backup in the office".
Ah, the glory days of running out of a single co-lo across the parking lot with our "backup site" being a former broom closet.
And it wasn't even raining outside! So I grab some plastic to cover the racks and phone in emergency portable cooling as the room's AC started failing.
It turns out earlier that day, a technician performing seasonal maintenance on a boiler tank on the roof had drained the tank and refilled it. But instead of directing the water out into a proper drain, he sent it down a convenient pipe that was actually a vent from our ceiling into the boiler house. The boiler was dozens of meters from my server room, but the water followed the old steel and plaster ceiling remnants over to my computers.
And this boiler water was more exciting than rain: it came with all the dissolved minerals, metals, and preservatives computers crave! I didn't lose any computers in the racks, but it killed the Liebert's control board.
If that were the case they wouldn't be saying "There is no current ETA for recovery," and "it is expected to be an extended outage. Customers are advised to failover to other regions."
You could always test this in a live environment before a region becomes open to customers.
Restoration is hard when health and safety are in question. Good luck to these ops folks <3
[1] https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/06/01/expl...
It was before dam (1) was built and floods were a huge problem in SPB
Our DC was intact, but the building and access was cut-off. We lost the backup diesel power generators in the flooding. Of course, grid power was cut-off.
Our DC operating team managed to shutdown all the servers and racks cleanly before UPS power was completely drained. The 4 engineers and 2 security guards then swam out of the compound in chest high waters. (I am not kidding).
When the rains subsided and the flood waters receded after a couple of days, we had to plan the restart. The facility still had to be certified by health and safety, but we needed to get the datacenter back up.
A secondary operations site that would remote-connect to the DC was brought up in 1 week since we estimated the rains to potentially continue for a few more days and cause interruptions. But the critical item for the plan to work was getting a new backup power setup. We rolled in a truck-mounted diesel generator and positioned it in the highest point in the campus (also close to our building tower that had the DC) and ran power cables to it (we had to source this and it was a challenge to do it with the time crunch and the rains).
We moved staff to other cities by bus (airport was shutdown) as part of our recovery plan, but we still needed connectivity to our DC for some of the critical processes.
Long story short, it worked.
I'll never forget the experience and the scars from this war story.
In any case, it is good you didn't have to go through a DC recovery during one of the worst disasters in the 21st century.
The question I keep asking in all DR planning sessions/table top exercises is - what would we do if we had a situation like what happened in Fukushima or in Chennai 2015. In both cases, flooding caused failure of backup power generators. Also, what do we do when we have all or partial resources, but are faced with a denial-of-premises situation (what I faced).
Anyone experience with losing an entire DC to flooding?
edit: I just Googled it (lol) and this DC has to be brand spanking new (https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/google...), apparently they just opened it last June. Google must be livid with the contractors who built the place for it to get flooded so soon.