If it's being done by the firmware on the Qualcomm SOC then a firewall in Android is not going to save you.
So yes, Android - or rather the Linux kernel on which Android is built - is going to "save me" in that I am in control over which application (including whatever Qualcomm uses) gets to send data. Apple users are out of luck since iOS does not allow this type of filtering but Android does.
Do you have any documentation on this? Even firmware such as Intel ME or UEFI implementations connect directly to the Internet itself. So I have a hard time believing the firmware on a Qualcomm SOC does not directly connect to the Internet itself.
It's a privileged app ( a service in Android lang ) that once fetched sends the data to the modem, where GPS is actively implemented, and augmented by such extra data.
Android, being built on top of Linux which contains Netfilter as I explained elsewhere [1] which allows you to block network access no matter whether the data originates from some hardware chip or somewhere else. The only way data could make its way off the device is if the radio firmware made a covert connection to Qualcomm which could be used to totally bypass the Linux kernel. That connection would not use the system IP stack and it could work even if the user does not have data active. It would need cooperation from network operators (all over the world) to get the data out of the carrier's network to Qualcomm. This is not what this article is about, it is quite possible that the likes of the NSA are up to this type of shenanigans since they may be able to force carriers to do their bidding [2] but Qualcomm is just another corporation looking to 'get to know their customers'. Read the article and you'll see that the data is exfiltrated through Android. A default block for outgoing data - like I use - blocks this just as well as it blocks other similar attempts.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35707645
[2] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-att-helped-th...
The kernel never even sees it.
That's the only sane way to have a working device that needs to handle signals.
It's not hidden in any way, and the kernel/Android actively talks with it, configures it, turns it on/off.
In fact, the article claims:
> During operation, the covert operating system (AMSS) has complete control over the hardware, microphone and camera
Correlation does not equate causation but they want you to think it does so you run to their web shop to buy a rebranded Google Pixel 7 (with Samsung's Exynos 5300 radio modem and accompanying firmware which has just as much control over the hardware as Qualcomm's AMSS has...).
The AMSS has control of the hardware, but there's different components, each implementing different functionality, they may be able to talk with each other using various IPC mechanism, and they do, but mostly using Android as a middleman ( Linux )
WiFi ( known as cnss on QCOM ) is implemented in a different block than GPS, they don't have direct communication in place. It's routed via the Linux kernel ( and userspace processes )
> We also didn't place a SIM-card in the phone either so it could only send and receive data over the WIFI network which we are monitoring with Wireshark. Wireshark is a professional software tool which allows us to monitor and analyze all traffic being sent over the network.
If the claims of Qualcomm using its hidden AMSS operating system for data exfiltration were true it would not matter whether the device has a SIM card installed or not. Even without a SIM card the thing is still able to reach cell towers, it still has an IMEI, it can still be used to call emergency services (112 or 911 etc), it just won't have an IMSI. Mobile operators are by law mandated to enable connectivity to emergency services to all devices so those connections are passed to their destination. Without an IMSI they do not know who to bill for connectivity so they do not pass any other traffic for such devices. Even with a SIM and thus an IMSI there is no guarantee the subscriber has paid for data so again the operator will only provide connectivity when there is some account to bill it to.
> After we provided our WiFi password in the setup wizard, the router assigned our /e/OS de-Googled phone a local IP address and it started generating traffic.
The data is exfiltrated through WiFi - which goes through the Linux kernel, using the Linux driver for the WiFi hardware. A default block for outgoing traffic puts an end to this just as surely as removing the battery does bar any covert manipulations of the device.
Realise that those who wrote this article are trying to sell you something, hence this rather poor article which tries to insinuate Qualcomm has somehow managed to get mobile operators to cooperate in a scheme to send private customer data through a covert channel. Realise also that they claim their 'Nitrokey' device does not contain a Qualcomm modem. That is quite possible... but it does contain a radio modem and the accompanying RT OS to control it - radio firmware delivered as a blob to be installed on that Nitrophone which is nothing more than a rebranded Google Pixel - using a Samsung Exynos 5300 modem - with GrapheneOS installed.
This is a sales pitch, nothing else.
As to aGPS being necessary this depends on how often you use GPS. Without aGPS it takes a while for the device to lock after a total cold start but once it has locked it should be able to reacquire lock within a short timeframe. As long as you do not move more than 100 km from the position you were when you last switched off GPS, the clock is within 20 seconds and you're not breaking any speed limits you'll get a fix within a few minutes assuming the receiver can see some satellites. In other words, GPS works fine without aGPS.