Re:Prompt injection: what’s the worst that can happen?
by nicpottier on Friday April 14, 2023 @09:55PM
(#35576946)
This is clever but isn't this dramatically easier than actually doing something with the input? You've gated things (and though I didn't crack it I'm really not convinced it is secure) but you also aren't DOING anything. That's a much easier problem. There are easier and more effective ways of gating LLMs based on a passcode.
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Re:Prompt injection: what’s the worst that can happen?
by mcaledonensis on Friday April 14, 2023 @10:34PM
(#35577143)
Well, this is a showcase that it's not impossible to construct a defense, that doesn't fall instantly, with a couple of characters as an input.
And it was only a quick experiment, very small scale. I've collected a small list of attack prompts. Applied them onto my prompt, gradually increasing the N to 50. I've tweaked the prompt to stabilize it on a weaker gpt-3.5-turbo model. It was about 600 attacks total, per try. Once the defense started working, I've confirmed that it works with gpt-4, which is more steerable with the system prompt.
The weak points are that the list of attacks was small. It is also still somewhat responsive to prompt editing requests.
Re:Prompt injection: what’s the worst that can happen?
by MacsHeadroom on Saturday April 15, 2023 @08:04AM
(#35579835)
I cracked it in two tries.