I'm also not sure why everyone perceived my comment as anti-bayesian.
But are you sure you know what I meant when I said “uninformative prior”? Because choosing an uninformative prior does not involve choosing any parameters: there is only one uninformative prior, and it’s the constant (flat) distribution which assigns equal probability to every value. It encodes no information and does not bias the posterior or result. It is the one and only mathematically-neutral prior. You can think of it as being a bit like an “identity function”.
Ultimately, I think you are strawmanning frequentism here. Just because the log likelihood is sometimes the same as the map does not imply that they have the same meaning. This is why computed uncertainties of both approaches are often not the same and have a not-so-subtle difference in their interpretation. The one computes uncertainty in belief, the other imprecision of an experiment. You can't summarize that with "do you want to be explicit about assumptions".
I am not straw-manning anything: bayesian methods are a generalization of frequentist methods. The equality / isomorphism to frequentist methods, in the special case of the uninformative prior, is commonly demonstrated in introductory (undergrad-level) bayesian textbooks and is in fact trivial. One need not even talk of any infinities: if you’re doing discrete observations, infinities never show up (and in that case the prior normalizes just fine). And if you’re curve-fitting (ie.: using parametric methods), the “infinite” line goes away as soon as you multiply your uninformative prior with your likelihood.
The only question is… would you rather be up front and explicit about your assumptions, or not?
An uninformative prior is an assumption, even if it’s the one that doesn’t bias the posterior (note that here “bias” is not a bad word).