You assume that all risk is default risk. The risk that SVB took wasn't that the US govt will default on its bonds. It was that the treasuries will lose their value in case of interest rate changes.
SVB bought billions of dollars of US treasuries which lost their value in the last year due to rate hikes. This showed up as unrealized losses on their balance sheet which spooked their depositors and precipitated the collapse.
I think you're right that no bank can withstand a run of that magnitude, and it has been pointed out elsewhere in the thread that entities that can do so aren't really a bank anymore. However, the bank run only occurred because it was public knowledge that SVB had terrible duration risk, so it's somewhat of a chicken-or-egg problem.
All the findings that came out since then points to minimal duration hedging on SVB's part, so all in all it sounds like a bank that was poorly managed, perhaps adapted too well to a ZIRP world, and was ripe for a run to happen.
They're not right. No bank could sell assets quickly enough to withstand such a run, but that's why the Fed serves as lender of last resort. Even under previous policy, the Fed would lend against the mark-to-market value of the collateral. So in theory any MTM-solvent bank could survive any run, so there was no incentive to start the run in the first place.
The SVB was MTM insolvent due to that excessive duration risk, so it couldn't do that. It's not the only MTM-insolvent bank (see the link in my other comment), but that in combination with its unusually high fraction of uninsured and thus flighty deposits was apparently enough to start the run.
> “We were well under way with the transfer of collateral and were waiting for a call from the Federal Reserve and SVB,” a spokesperson for the San Francisco FHLB said. “And while we were waiting for a call, the FDIC took over SVB.”
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-last-ditch-effort-to-sa...
The FDIC intervened because that was unlikely to save the SVB--those loans could fully resolve a liquidity crisis, but they actually make a solvency crisis worse for the remaining depositors, since an insolvent bank becomes relatively more insolvent with each dollar withdrawn. It's bad for public trust when a bank shuts down with $100B in deposits backed by only $90B in assets; but it's much worse when the run continues until there's $10B in deposits backed by nothing.
In traditional banking, rising interest rates are a good thing because it means that banks in turn get to underwrite loans at higher interest rates, which positively affects their bottom line. SVB's problems were twofold: A) they had a one-dimensional investment strategy that was adversely affected by rising rates, and B) outstanding loans made up a very small portion of their business relative to their size, which made it so that they weren't able to capture meaningful value from rising interest rates. The latter is actually pretty rare for a bank, which shows how uninterested they were in actually functioning like one.
Liquidity is about bid/ask spreads, disorderly markets in which the price becomes temporarily irrational. The SVB's problem was simply the time value of money, that the liquid and economically rational price of their long-term bond-like assets is lower than they wished it would be.
This paper estimates that 190/4800 ~ 4% of banks would have deposits at risk if half of uninsured deposits were withdrawn. That means 96% of banks wouldn't. The SVB's situation wasn't completely unique, but it's far from the norm.
Meanwhile, the bank run happened because people noticed the horrible risk management, not randomly. And those people talked.
No. SVB chose to pursue a risky investment strategy with no risk manager at the helm for months, the banking equivalent of stupidly storing all of your nitrous fertilizer in one place and then being surprised when the whole thing blows up.
SVB made numerous, critical mistakes in their management. If anything, one could argue the Fed enabled this stupidity by keeping rates low for so long. But ultimately, the failure falls on the bank.