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Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by michaelt on Friday March 24, 2023 @04:10AM (#35286354)
Jump into a time machine, go back to the creation of SSH, and adopt SSL-style trusted third-party certificate authorities. Somehow get it adopted anyway, even though loads of people use SSH on internal networks where host-based authentication is difficult; SSH is how many headless machines are bootstrapped; and that you've got to do it 19 years before Lets Encrypt.

Jump into a lesser time machine, go back to when Github were creating their SSH key, and put it into a hardware security module. Somehow share that hardware-backed security key to loads of servers over a network, without letting hackers do the same thing. Somehow get an HSM that isn't a closed-source black box from a huge defence contractor riddled with foreign spies. Somehow avoid vendor lock-in or the HSM becoming obsolete. Somehow do this when you're a scrappy startup with barely any free time.

Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by nibbleshifter on Friday March 24, 2023 @05:23AM (#35286825)
Ssh certificate authorities are a thing that exists.

We also have a way to put SSH host key fingerprints in DNS records already.

Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by Arch-TK on Friday March 24, 2023 @05:31AM (#35286874)
Yes but the option to do verify host keys using ("VerifyHostKeyDNS") is not enabled by default.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by roblabla on Friday March 24, 2023 @06:37AM (#35287286)
DNS can trivially be mitm'd. DNS-stored fingerprints are strictly less secure than TOFU.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by tialaramex on Friday March 24, 2023 @09:40AM (#35288923)
If you use DNSSEC (cue inevitable rant from Thomas) this just works. If you have DoH (and why wouldn't you?) and your trusted resolver uses DNSSEC (which popular ones do), you get the same benefits.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSHFP_record

Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by datadeft on Friday March 24, 2023 @07:03AM (#35287458)
Yeah like how HTTPS CAs exist. There are some very nice three letter ones who can issue any certificate and your browser / OS happily accepts it.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by BenjiWiebe on Friday March 24, 2023 @08:31AM (#35288154)
SSH doesn't have any CAs that it trusts out of the box. It's up to you to tell it which one to trust.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by prussian on Friday March 24, 2023 @08:32AM (#35288170)
Unless it has changed recently, you can't have a trust chain of OpenSSH certs though so it's cumbersome that your signing key is not only the root ca but also basically has to be 24/7 accessible to sign any server/client you want to bring up.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by lxgr on Friday March 24, 2023 @09:41AM (#35288931)
This just kicks the can down the road to DNS.

I'd guess that most systems aren't using DoH/DoT or end-to-end DNSSEC yet. Some browsers do, but that doesn't help tooling frequently used on the command line.

Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by tptacek on Friday March 24, 2023 @11:15AM (#35290138)
No browser uses DNSSEC.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by lxgr on Friday March 24, 2023 @11:40AM (#35290544)
That was in reference to the former, i.e. in-browser DoH/DoT lookups.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by nibbleshifter on Saturday March 25, 2023 @10:43AM (#35303107)
Thank god. Someone needs to take that protocol out back and give it the old yeller treatment.
Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by tinus_hn on Friday March 24, 2023 @07:31AM (#35287655)
There could be an update to the protocol that enables certified keys to be used and allows them to be accepted without warning or with less of a warning.

There could be a well known URL that enables people to fetch ssh keys automatically in a safe manner.

Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by marcosdumay on Friday March 24, 2023 @11:17AM (#35290163)
> and adopt SSL-style trusted third-party certificate authorities

So that any large entity can own your servers with easy. (Well, they already can, but not through this vulnerability.)

Anyway, the only thing CAs do is to move that prompt into another, earlier time. It's the same prompt, the same possibility for MITM, and the same amount of shared trust to get wrong. You just add a 3rd party that you have to trust.

SSH does have a CA system. Anybody that isn't managing a large datacenter will avoid it, for good reason.

Re:We updated our RSA SSH host key by michaelt on Friday March 24, 2023 @12:03PM (#35291005)
> So that any large entity can own your servers with easy.

Eh, let's not pretend existing SSL certificate validation is anything to write home about.

Even without any ephemeral servers involved, barely anybody is validating cert fingerprints on first use.

And among people using ephemeral servers, 99% of applications have either baked a certificate into their image (so that any compromised host means a compromise of the critical, impossible-to-revoke-or-rotate key) - or every new server gets a new cert and users have either been trained to ignore certificate warnings, or they've disabled strict host key checking and their known hosts file.

The existing SSL cert validation options are perfect if you're a home gamer or you're running a few dozen bare metal servers with all your SSL users within yelling distance in the same office. But we all know it's a joke beyond that.