Isn't the LLM just good at giving us the illusion of such effective communication? How can we have true "shared meaning" with a device designed to simulate the experience of shared meaning? Isn't the fact that it's 'mind' is truly unknowable and unrelatable a demonstration of Derrida's point?
When I use GitHub Copilot, I'll often write a comment describing some code I want it to implement and then it spits out a suggestion. Occasionally it fails badly at this and I realize I worded my comment badly. When I reword the comment better and then find that Copilot's next suggestion nails it what I wanted, is that not the result of me effectively communicating with it through the comment? (If I did that with a human coworker instead, is that communication?)
I think a lot of our widely held cultural beliefs on this front have been informed by academic philosophy from the 60s, 70s, and 80s. In particular, I would go do far as to say that Hubert Dreyfus, author of the book "What computers can't do" and frequent friendly adversary of Daniel Dennett, has a lot of responsibility here. He is famous for claiming computers would never become competitive at chess because chess required "insight", and always differentiated computer capabilities from complex behavior or human-like behavior, because the latter had something special that could only be represented with vague and underdefined terms. Even now I think Dreyfus is approvingly cited, while his core thesis is getting closer to being refuted every day if it hasn't been already.