Everywhere I went, I'd ask people what they thought about the coming European Union. To a person, they were all cautiously supportive, but would also say "But I don't trust the Germans." Everyone expected the Germans would have designs on controlling the thing, and likely the ability to do it. Even the Germans seemed to expect it.
These were the proverbial people on the street, so I'm guessing everyone pretty much knew how it was going to go in the long run.
The real game-changer was the rushed enlargement. Now Germany can count on a political bloc of countries directly depending on the German economy, and for anyone else it's much more difficult to steer the boat with so many people on board.
Now Germany has high debt, but was dealing with this problem years ago to keep in under control. More has to be done, but we are further than we thought.
The industry is more competitive in terms of delivery capability, production technology and products.
The decentral structure of the country enabled competition within the country - between Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, Köln, Düsseldorf, Leipzig, Dresden, ... there is no such central structure like in France or the UK.
Key was to keep employment high. Youth unemployment is very low. General unemployment is on a 20 year low. This kept people confident. Confident that they have enough to weather this economic crisis. Germans save more, they speculate less and many prefer renting instead of owning (and being in debt).
There were some mistakes made (like some of the German banking system failed), but in general it looks okay.
People don't remember the political climate at the time: 20 years ago, when the Euro was planned and sanctioned, Germany was still divided, and West Germany was the top dog in economic terms among European countries (even more so than today) while most other countries (including France and UK) were fighting a recession. German public opinion didn't want to partake from the almighty Deutsche Mark, which was a rock in troubled seas (the British Pound was crashing, the French Franc was weak, the Italian Lira was losing 20% every 10 years, etc etc); French and Italian elites thought that a common currency would have allowed them to harness the German industrial strength, basically helping themselves to low interest rates they wouldn't have enjoyed otherwise.
The German establishment mostly saw the Euro as a straight-jacket, a burden to accept in order to bring about their own reunification, which otherwise would have been opposed across Europe (a reunited Germany would have been dangerously powerful on its own).
As it happens, it turned out better for them than for other members; this is why they keep insisting on a monetary approach to public policy that will keep others down, at least until this suites them.