Altruism is also indicated by leaving the sweets for the trapped rat.
Im not a neuroscientist, but I can guess the mirror neurons are at play.
It's not to say that animals are incapable, but such assumptions cannot be made without the insight being held suspect.
The notion of aid implies it has a mental model of the other rat and that it consideres the other rat as a rat that needs help.
I don't understand why people always think of humans as outstanding and totally different from other species. Or do you think that humans are only exhibiting kin selection too and that empathy is nothing but a ideological concept? How do you prove empathy in humans? (And please apply the same rigor.)
I think we should be just as careful ascribing internal models to human actions that we observe, where we might be even more tempted to jump to conclusions because we think we must be familiar what goes on in other humans' minds.
So, to summarize, I think humans really do feel empathy (I know I do, and I choose to believe others do too), and I know humans will often engage in altruistic behavior. I'm not certain that without empathy we wouldn't engage in the altruistic behavior, though it's likely we'd engage in less. So yes, I do actively apply the same rigor to this area where ethics, philosophy of mind, and neuroscience are meeting. It's a fascinating topic! But it's an area that's easily politicized (morality takeaways tend to be applied quickly...) so I always err on the side of careful interpretation.
It is oversimplifying to say something like "oh it's helping the other rat for selfish reason X", but it is equally misleading to apply human models of mind, which we have due to our unique ability to introspect and share that introspection with other members of our species.
Models such as kin selection (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kin_selection) attempt to explain altruism within an evolutionary model, but even if there is a totally different cause for this particular altruistic behavior (and even if it is shown to be almost wholly altruistic, rather than just indirectly self-beneficial, assuming such a distinction exists), there are very few grounds to assume empathy.
The most interesting result to me is that the rats demonstrate distress at seeing the suffering, and cease upon release. But before talking about empathy again, we must show that the distress is its own separate thing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voight-Kampff_test#Voight-Kampf...) rather than mere frustration at failed attempts of rescue.
So, sure, we've learned something, but I don't think we've demonstrated empathy.