The horse has been beaten to death - DNSSEC is dead. It continues to see adoption on the authoritative side because turning it on in a basic state and letting it limp along costs almost nothing.

Many recursive servers do validate DNSSEC, but disable it on a per-zone basis when validation failures happen and users start to complain.

tptacek raises an additional good point that DNSSEC does nothing to protect the last mile of a query. It also provides zero confidentiality.

dnscrypt was always a superior implementation, but saw little uptake because people blindly believed the DNSSEC propaganda.

From my perspective, DNSSEC is very much alive, and moreso every year. At work, we only ever see requests for more DNSSEC from everybody; both customers and TLDs/registries. Nobody at conferences, both formally and in informal conversations, has said anything against DNSSEC in principle. I used to say that I ever only saw one person argue against DNSSEC; and it was here on HN. I guess that I can now say that it is two people, both here on HN.

If validation failures were that common, I would think I, working at a domain registrar and authoritative DNS provider, would hear about it. The last mile problem would be solved by DoT/DoH, no?

If anything is a “dead horse”, it’s dnscrypt. Are you claiming that DNSSEC is some sort of industry conspiracy?

It's a conspiracy, but not from the industry, which has broadly rejected it. :)

What “industry” would that be? Certainly not the DNS industry, or their customers (i.e. anybody who wants a domain name). Do you mean “rejected” in the same sense as how IPv6 is still only slowly being adopted?