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Re:Privilege drop, separation, and restricted-service operat... by daneel_w on Wednesday February 22, 2023 @08:54AM (#34895466)
> "OpenBSD's efforts in auditing are not a good compromise. It's not any compromise. It's best practices that do very little to help in the event of an actual breach."

> "... a remote root bug (despite not running as root) that granted a shell ..."

This example of yours would begin with an exploit (or feature) of the third-party software, which in turn managed to pivot into an exploitable hole in the kernel/base system in order to gain these escalated privileges. Securing the kernel/base system is where their focus is.

I'm not challenging the idea of a blanketing solution like AppArmour, just the notion that the OpenBSD team's efforts are "terrible" and "simply not sufficient".

Re:Privilege drop, separation, and restricted-service operat... by Zurrrrr on Wednesday February 22, 2023 @08:38PM (#34905660)
> This example of yours would begin with an exploit (or feature) of the third-party software, which in turn managed to pivot into an exploitable hole in the kernel/base system in order to gain these escalated privileges. Securing the kernel/base system is where their focus is.

Sure, but the 'base' system doesn't really have anything that people use or that is going to have bugs. It's kind of a copout.

> just the notion that the OpenBSD team's efforts are "terrible" and "simply not sufficient".

Terrible is maybe a bit strong, but they certainly are not sufficient. There are numerous exploits and exploitation paths that pledge and unveil won't prevent, but MAC/RBAC or other DAC alternatives will.