The corporate fiduciary duty to maximize profit is a discredited myth that unfortunately has been propagated for decades by simple inertia, ignorance, and (perhaps) unenlightened and cynical self-interest on the part of wealthy corporate shareholders.

Corporate leaders are expected to act in the interests of shareholders, but their legal obligations are satisfied if they can argue that their business judgment supported their chosen direction. And business judgment can consider the long term, it can consider the value of a thriving society in general, it can consider much besides short-term maximization of profit. Fiduciary duty exists only to curb overtly abusive self-dealing.

For more on this, see The Shareholder Value Myth by Lynn Stout.

What exactly is the difference between it being in their general interests to maximize profit besides where that interest conflicts with the law, and it being their legal duty to do so instead? Does it not result in the same thing? Companies break the law all the time in the interest of the profit motive.

It matters because there is one less rationalization for why we have to tolerate corporate leaders engaging in evil. It is their free choice, not a legal obligation, and that should affect how we think about them as moral agents in society.

Maybe it also helps them realize that they have a choice too, that they are not "just following orders" from the legal system.

I get it, but you do realize that Intuit does exist because taxes are so damn complicated in the US?

If taxes were simple, their predatory business model really would stop existing. There is no business justification in favor of Intuit to NOT sue the IRS if the IRS tries to make taxes simple.

This "X company has a fiduciary duty to turn a profit to shareholders regardless of the consequence" thinking is not true but shockingly pervasive across HN recently.

Fiduciary duty responsibilities are about putting the interests of the company in front of personal interests, and are mostly designed to protect shareholders. In other words, not doing things like signing up for a product you don't need just because you happened to angel invest in the company and it would benefit your portfolio. There are other fiduciary responsibilities as well, but certainly none of them are "return as much money to shareholders, or else."

Regardless, if we want this world where the government has publicly funded tax software that just works and is easy (and I personally do), the right way to solve it is through public policy changes.

This is called 'crony capitalism'.

How is what you described late stage capitalism as opposed to simply capitalism?

Because "late-stage" is a buzzword nobody can define.

I think late-stage is usually used to imply that while many of these mechanics can be useful as a way to efficiently allocate capital in some earlier stages of capitalism where private companies are more distributed and act less like governments, that when they finally go to their eventual conclusion and companies meaningfully go toe to toe with the government (and even finish regulatory capture), it becomes pathological and harmful.

I'd say, more succinctly, that late-stage capitalism is when the maximizing of profit ceases to simply be a means to an end, and becomes an end in itself.

At least, that's more or less how I personally view it.

In the United States in the late 1800s, wealth was incredibly concentrated in a few families and as far as I can tell they ran the government. So it was late stage back then, would that make now post late stage?

On the other hand, I would think that late stage capitalism would be defined when there is regulation of greed to prevent predatory and monopolistic practices that reduce competition. Or maybe that should just be called sustainable capitalism?