In addition, this is an F35A vs Gripen E, so the Gripen has a better STOL capability, likely better radar (rotating GaN), more mature avionics link, supercruise, similar RCS (apart from frontal, it's likely to be smaller, red flag exercises hinted that they were not really detectable) and faster software updates.
WRT stealth, if you want to be stealthy you can't use active radar, only passive. As such having IRST capability in addition to a good datalink is extremely useful to detect other aircraft. The F22 has no IR capability so is at a disadvantage in BVR from that, similar for the F35 which (I think) only has a downward targeting IR.
From a reliability perspective, the Gripen is a long way ahead, the duty availability F35s is probably 70% at best by now (2019 figure was 50% https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-06-16/q...) mainly due to parts shortage. The F35 still can't fly in stormy weather due to lightning strikes etc.
I've no doubt the F35 can be a capable aircraft, just not compared to it's competitors. The decision, as usual, is more a political one.
The Austrian Eurofighters can fly and operate without those keys, they just won't be able to join NATO Link-16 networks or other encrypted NATO communications or navigation networks. This is standard practice for all modern combat aircraft, incidentally, as encryption keys are rotated on a regular basis and need to be loaded into the aircraft's onboard systems before flight. The data can also include additional interoperability elements such as TDMA slice allocations in the case of Link-16.
The reason it has to be done by the unnamed contractor is because Austria is not a member of NATO, so it can't be given control over key handling. The same is true for Sweden & Switzerland.
It's a logical tradeoff. Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland get access to encrypted NATO networks and can therefore interoperate seamlessly with NATO forces, but they're always free to opt-out. Sweden for instance has fall-backs to national data links and communications networks to which only it has the encryption keys.
STOL capabilities https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2020/august/gripen-des...
Radar, note that's I'd said it's an estimate, based on the fact that it's the first GaN radar and has a wider FOV https://www.saab.com/markets/india/gripen-for-india/technolo...
More mature here means has been around longer in one from or another, since the Viggen: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saab_37_Viggen
Supercruise https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercruise
RCS is an overall estimate, certainly not from the front as the F35 is designed as a strike fighter, but with a smaller plane, the RCS may well be similar elsewhere https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2021/01/07/gripen/
Fast software updates https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2021/january/gripen-so...
Anyway, this is missing the point, which that it's difficult to trust a platform that you don't have the source code to, have to use a parts management system that phones home, and a system that uploads flight data back home. Ownership in this case means having the ability to independently run the aircraft without reliance on other countries' benevolence. In that capacity, whether your adversary is Russia, or some other country is irrelevant.
>STOL capabilities https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2020/august/gripen-des...
Who really cares about STOL capabilities of the Gripen? Unless you're on a small island, you can build longer runways.
>Radar, note that's I'd said it's an estimate, based on the fact that it's the first GaN radar and has a wider FOV https://www.saab.com/markets/india/gripen-for-india/technolo...
Gripen E's radar being better than that of the F-35 is certainly an unique take. The AN/APG-81 has a 71.4% bigger aperture than the ES-05. While the ES-05 does benefit from reduced power consumption due to the GaN transistors, it still has significantly lower peak output power than the AN/APG-81.
Wider FOV is nice, but the AN/APG-81 can see further. AN/APG-81 is the better radar out of the two, and also offers better EW capabilities than the ES-05.
>More mature here means has been around longer in one from or another, since the Viggen: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saab_37_Viggen
I believe the word you're looking for is "older", even though "more mature" sounds nicer.
>Supercruise https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercruise
The Gripen E can only supercruise according to SAABs very own original definition of "supercruise", and so far there's been no indication that it can do so while carrying weapons.
>RCS is an overall estimate, certainly not from the front as the F35 is designed as a strike fighter, but with a smaller plane, the RCS may well be similar elsewhere https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2021/01/07/gripen/
If Gripen was as stealthy as you like to suggest, SAAB would be shouting it from the rooftops. Yet, they aren't.
>Fast software updates https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2021/january/gripen-so...
Meaningless marketing speak.
Anyway,
> Ownership in this case means having the ability to independently run the aircraft without reliance on other countries' benevolence.
Good luck operating Gripens without relying on the benevolence of the US, UK and Sweden.
As for the ownership question, why does it matter to Finland that have complete control over their aircraft? Why do they need to prevent flight data from being set back to the US? Most importantly, why do they need to be able to independently operate the aircraft? It's only purpose is to fight Russians, and now that they're joining NATO they would be fighting Russians alongside the US.
The article has: The principle is simple: Finland is to be able to keep the aircraft up in the air even if the borders are shut. To ensure that Finland will have an indigenous maintenance and repair capability for over 100 components (including parts of the fuselage and engine), which is based on the items covered by the industrial cooperation agreement. There will also be significant stockpiles of components that aren’t on the list of items which Finland can repair and overhaul organically (often parts with very long mean time between failures, and for which it aren’t economical to build up an independent repair capability). Notable is also that the Finnish organic repair capability is not just for domestic use, but is also part of the GSS (the global support solution) meaning that they will be used to maintain parts for the global spares pool.
The deal does mention "opportunities for the Finnish defense industry related to the direct manufacture and maintenance of the F-35..." which I'm not sure exactly what it is. I thought the US and Lockheed were extremely reluctant to this kind of transfer.