Re:Pro-SOPA Comcast just implemented SOPA-incompatible DNSSEC
by wmf on Wednesday January 11, 2012 @05:45PM
(#3454058)
I'm not talking about timeouts; I'm talking about immediately returning an error (apparently DNSSEC will break if you return NXDOMAIN, but there are other error codes). If browsers retry or hang after getting a DNS error, I guess they'll have to be fixed.
Re:Pro-SOPA Comcast just implemented SOPA-incompatible DNSSEC
by newhouseb on Wednesday January 11, 2012 @06:13PM
(#3454162)
How do you mean 'break'? As I understand it, NXDOMAIN also has to be signed with a trust chain back to a root authority. I guess what I don't know enough to answer is if there are other equally sufficient error codes that don't require a trust chain (which would be surprising because allowing any non-trusted responses would seem to defeat the entire purpose of a non-tamperable DNS service)
Re:Pro-SOPA Comcast just implemented SOPA-incompatible DNSSEC
by pyre on Wednesday January 11, 2012 @07:49PM
(#3454523)
I think that DNSSEC is more concerned with preventing DNS poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks than with using NXDOMAIN to block access.
Re:Pro-SOPA Comcast just implemented SOPA-incompatible DNSSEC
by koenigdavidmj on Wednesday January 11, 2012 @07:31PM
(#3454460)
Only the answers in the DNS response are signed. The DNS header (which is where the NXDOMAIN lives) is not signed.
Re:Pro-SOPA Comcast just implemented SOPA-incompatible DNSSEC
by tedunangst on Wednesday January 11, 2012 @10:50PM
(#3454969)
It doesn't matter if the NXDOMAIN is forged or not (or whether forgery is detected or not). It's not like you can unforge and extract the original IP from such a response. Your browser can flash all the red warning lights it wants, you're not going to connect to the naughty site. DNSSEC does absolutely nothing to impede DNS blacklisting.
Re:Pro-SOPA Comcast just implemented SOPA-incompatible DNSSEC
by wmf on Wednesday January 11, 2012 @11:58PM
(#3455111)
That's never been the issue. When people claim that "SOPA breaks DNSSEC" (note they don't say the reverse) they mean that a SOPA blockage looks the same as a MITM attack from the client's perspective. As I've explained earlier, ISPs can choose to make it look like a DNS server outage instead of an MITM; this might produce fewer misleading errors in the browser. SOPA works fine as written, it just makes DNS debugging harder. "Users running secure applications have a need to distinguish between policy-based failures and failures caused, for example, by the presence of an attack or a hostile network, or else downgrade attacks would likely be prolific." http://www.circleid.com/pdf/PROTECT-IP-Technical-Whitepaper-...
If ISPs wanted to avoid this scenario, it would essentially require fracturing DNS[SEC] into something the US Govt has the authority to sign properly without effecting the rest of the world - in other words a completely divided national internet.
Or we could just all switch to using DNSSEC servers on the Barbados Islands or something in the future.