> the 100,000 PBKDF2 iterations on the server side are only applied to the master password hash, not to the encryption key
The attacker doesn’t need to break the master password hash, so it’s irrelevant. This is elaborated in the link directly following the above quote:
> But that protection only works if the attackers are stupid enough to verify their master password guesses via the authentication hash.
So only the password hash itself gets the extra iterations. The diagram and the text of the whitepaper seem to be at odds, though. The diagram doesn't show extra iterations for the encryption key, but the whitepaper says:
> PBKDF-SHA256 is used to derive the encryption key from your Master Password. Then this key is salted and hashed for authenticating with the Bitwarden servers. The default iteration count used with PBKDF2 is 100,001 iterations on the client (this client-side iteration count is configurable from your account settings), and then an additional 100,000 iterations when stored on our servers (for a total of 200,001 iterations by default).
Bitwarden's API likely doesn't permit anybody to access the encrypted blobs of anybody. You have to authenticate at the server to be able to access your blob. Since the iterations might be low for producing the master key and therefore the master password hash, the server must treat the master password hash as just another password and therefore iterate the hash quite often (100,000x).
Assuming no malicious insider or an outside attacker gets their hands on the encrypted blobs this is the most important attack prevention.
[0]: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Stor...