>converting massive amounts of coal to fertilizer

This isn’t anything new, IIRC PRC was converting ~50 million tons of fertilizer using coal gasification, which it has curtailed significantly under Xi to focus on emission goals by relying more on imports. But now that great power competition is back, security > environment. Combined with moving to better ag practices where net fertilizer use is decreasing while output increasing (PRC previously used a stupid amount of fertilizer / unit). Peak PRC fertilizer production was like 100M tons, current consumption is ~50M, down from high 60M. Circling back to ops point = PRC can indigenously supply their own fertilizer with domestic inputs which is enough for food security in terms of calories.

>elaborate hypothetical war plans

If by elaborate hypothetical war plans you mean establishing deterrence to mitigate world war levels of destruction by establishing more rungs of escalation than homeland strikes straight to nukes, I call that responsible planning. PRC pursuing a prompt global strike is part of the PLA's 2020 Science of Military Strategy, and acknowledged by the 2022 DoD report on PRC military. It’s no different than various US blob/warplanners plotting interventions on a TW scenario, replete with mainland strikes. If the US expects to escalate that far, of course the PRC is willing (and most importantly, increasingly able) to reciprocate.

Ultimately, this is merely the flip side of US efforts of "integrated deterrence", US wants to deter PRC reclaiming TW, and PRC wants to deter US from "blundering" into greater conflict by showing existential cost is now mutual. Then it circles back to the question of who wants it more. I imagine US polity wondering if intervening in TW is worth it if war follows to the US homeland. Not just revolutionary skirmishes but existential destruction that the US has so far been isolated against. I can imagine that impacts actual US decision making regardless of propaganda layer. What I can also imagine is CCP telling coastal elites, as it has consistently, that peaceful reunification is preferable but military force is not out of the question, and in the event of military force, mutual vulnerability to deter homeland strikes means their QoL will not spiral out of control. If the US is deterred from intervening, PRC can prosecute TW like US conducted wars in the Middle East, with little impact on domestic affairs, even less with strict media controls.

They may make plans, but when it comes time to actually wage a war against a fellow nuclear power that drops DEFCON levels, will they actually commit to a path such as striking American soil that will so inevitably wreck the very globalized interconnected system of political and economic ties that made modern China in the first place? Not to mention, it's all very well to build such intercontinental rockets, hard to say they will work as expected in an actual conflict. Perhaps the Pentagon will bring back Star Wars. Imperial Japan had such innovations as midget submarines and balloon bombs too, not all innovations work out in war, outside the imagination.

> mutual vulnerability to deter homeland strikes means their QoL will not spiral out of control

We are talking about a situation where the sheer disruption to world trade, never mind sanctions and the like, would drop quality of life. The sheer economic shocks and supply chain disruptions would be massive. You expect normal shipping to take place near a war zone, sanctions or no sanctions? The government can make all of the promises they'd like, things have a tendency to spiral out of control in war.

> PRC can prosecute TW like US conducted wars in the Middle East, with little impact on domestic affairs, even less with strict media controls.

On this I am of two minds. On one hand, it seems that inevitably, the Chinese public will lose the stomach for a protracted conflict that hurts their fellow Han people, especially those who they consider as fellow Chinese nationals, especially people whom they have not been at actual war with in seven decades, who they have shared plenty of trade, cultural, tourist ties with. On the other, I have read that often the contemporary popular sentiment is actually more raring for war than the actual current government is; perhaps in a way not dissimilar to U.S. public sentiment towards war in the Middle East after 9/11. So your guess is as good as mine as how the general population reacts to war. But I still believe that as modern China sees itself as a developed, advanced, optimistic society, there would be no shortage of people not wanting to commit to a brothers' war, at the very least because they consider it to be beneath the conduct of a civilized, stability-obsessed society.

Now flip the question. Will the US strike PRC mainland targets in a TW scenario, or will be deterred from doing so because PRC can hit CONUS? That's the point of deterrence, it figures as much in making plans as preventing plans of adversaries. PRC is as committed to counter striking American soil as the US is committed to striking PRC soil in what is legally an ongoing Chinese civil war. Which is to say, with proper deterrence in place, hopefully not very committed.

> not all innovations work out in war

PRC tests 100s of advanced missiles every year for more advanced targets, more than the rest of the world combined and has a sophisticated space program. At the end of the day, hitting large fixed targets like a refinery or power plant or data warehouse, all you need is sub 100m CEP - basically 80s technology. It’s maybe rocket science but not hard or innovative rocket science like hitting a moving ship at sea with all of the countermeasures and no way comparable to WW2 tier midget subs and unguided balloon bombs. Even Tom Clancy wouldn't make that comparison.

>expect normal shipping

Depending on scenario, if no outside intervention, then likely yes, TW ability to disrupt has relatively little window to counter strike PRC ports or ability threaten PRC shipping after being defanged. Probably just Xiamen has to be redirected, otherwise it's hard to overstate levels of force overmatch between PRC and TW. Like even the most ardent TW porcupine advocates don’t expect TW to put up a fight outside the island. Bay of Pigs disrupted the US minimally / not at all, because the US could simply prevent Cuba from hitting back.

>would drop quality of life

Question is by how much and who bears what cost? PRC exports to the west whose most likely to sanction is like >10% of GDP and decreasing, assuming all trade ceases, which it likely won't because supply chains at that scale aren't as fungible as energy. Also keep in mind PRC trade:GDP is lowish (35% trending down from 65% high), not US low (25% down from 30% high), but low enough that trade disruptions don't impact it as much as actual trade dependent actors (over 60%). Host of western countries fit that bill and would hurt more sanctioning PRC. It’s one reason why US can fuck around the world with relatively little domestic impact. Will QoL drop, sure, but the goal is to prevent scenarios where QoL will spiral, which assuming broader war is deterred, is possible. There’s also considerations that breaking TW will cause others QoL to drop more, i.e. west is going to suffer much more without high end TW semis where they get disproportionate value capture that’s already being denied to PRC.

While reality is complicated, half the reason people worry about TW scenarios AND trying to build up costs/deterrence is because conceivably, PRC can eat the cost. Like if Xi is offered to prosecute TW without US intervention in exchange for cutting off all trade with the west, he’d probably take it.

E: Over post limit, leaving this thread now.

>how the general population reacts to war

See how PRC gen pop reacted to HK protests / riots. Narcissism of small differences / manufacturing consent against related peoples is much easier than one thinks. In the end IMO a battle over TW is conditional based, not capability based, IMO PRC wouldn’t move against TW even if she has ability to, at least not for another 20 years. Trigger will be either TW moves towards independence in which case narrative writes itself, or US intervenes in which case protracted conflict is even easier to justify. After all, US intervention was why the civil war remains unresolved all these years. I think gen pop anywhere doesn't want war, but cross strait dynamic has always been averting resumption of war that could (and have) popped off several times in the last 70 years. Anyone over 50 in PRC knows the history, that includes anyone in senior leadership in the foreseeable future.

> TW ability to disrupt has relatively little window to counter strike PRC ports or ability threaten PRC shipping after being defanged.

Taiwan needn’t even attack mainland ports for there to be a slowdown in trade. No insurance company in the world is going to underwrite shipping through an active war zone, so routes that are near a blockade, let alone naval warfare, would be affected.

Insurance underwrites active war zones all the time with war risk cover / premium. Otherwise PRC has the 2nd largest (and growing) merchant fleet and can insure on their own in event of sanctions, which is unlikely because many trade dependent nations are much more vulnerable to disruption. Overall, affected sure, but again it’s a matter of how much. I contend not much, at least not enough to deter in a limited TW scenario with only PRC and TW as belligerents. Attacks on commercial shipping happen near coasts, look at where Mokova hit Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping occurred in the last few years, and that’s from define belligerents operating from much more permissive conditions. All the while energy continues to flow from the Gulf. Strait / adjacent routes “near” TW warzone can be diverted even further out, a few 100 nms to be nowhere "near '' active warzone, incidentally why this article's assumption that PRC controlled TW would threaten JP shipping is stupid. Naval warfare between PRC + US where shipping can be disrupted is a different story, but again, that’s why PRC building CONUS strike deterrent. Otherwise, limited PRC-TW scenario I imagine much less than zero covid levels of shipping disruption, few months to a year depending on how fast PRC rushes blockade, with single digit % hit on economy.