Yes, sure that's easy. Also now there are twice as many places from which an attacker can get your passwords. Oops?

Have you read the 1Password whitepaper? This isn’t exactly an easy target for any attacker.

I haven't read the 1Password whitepaper, could you elaborate? Would be curious what 1P is doing that is substantially more secure than what LP is doing (not counting the braindead stuff like not encrypting website URLs) Having been a 1P user, my guess is that, unlike LastPass, in 1P the data used to encrypt your vault includes both a completely random key and your master password, while in LastPass it's just your master password. Is there anything else?

Yes, 1P uses a random key additionally to the master key, like you described. That's the one 1P asks you to print out and hide somewhere, and which you also need when opening a vault on a new device. I don't know what LP does, but here are some notable things I gathered from the 1P whitepaper:

- 1P has a multi-layered approach: The master key + random key (+ salts) encrypt the user's private key, which in turn is used to decrypt the vault key (because the user's public key was used to encrypt the vault key). The vault key is used to decrypt the vault's items (each individually). Giving a new member access to a vault is done by encrypting the vault key with that member's public key. (I guess that's the same for LP)

- 1P encrypts all fields. BTW metadata and content fields are encrypted separately, such that the former can be decrypted faster for UI and search purposes.

- 1P uses Secure Remote Password, a zero knowledge proof which allows clients to authenticate with the 1P server without ever sending the actual password. Instead, during account creation, a derived key ("v") is sent from the client to the server that will be used to arrive at a shared secret during every authentication. They write in the paper that this is actually the reason for the random key that is needed in addition to the master key: It's impossible to brute-force the master key even if an attacker gains access to "v".

- Password recovery with 1P prevents the team "admin" from receiving the recovered vault's data (they do learn the vault key though, that's a necessity).

- 1P is constantly evaluating whether stronger encryption schemes (e.g. elliptic curve, or, further out, post quantum crypto) need to be implemented, and if such an update happens, they have already mapped out how vaults are upgraded. I think they increased PBKDF2 passes from 10k to 100k without breaking anything.

That's useless if you're migrating away because of security concerns. What you actually have to do is to go to all of the sites and change each of the passwords you have stored in LastPass.

As someone else - you should be doing this even if you're staying on lastpass.

It's what I've spent the last few days doing (hundreds of passwords), but then again, I'm also moving to bitwarden.

True, though I think this is a good practice in general if switching your password manager, even for benign reasons (price etc).

Actually, it's a very hard process since the easy process doesn't migrate all the data