Although it was starting on CSAM material, it wasn't clear which other illegal activities Apple would assist governments in tracking. In countries in which [being gay is illegal](https://www.humandignitytrust.org/lgbt-the-law/map-of-crimin...), having Apple employees aid law enforcement by pointing out photographic evidence of unlawful behaviour (for example, a man hugging his husband) would have been a recipe for grotesque human rights abuses.
With photos encrypted, Apple can't be pressured to hire human reviewers to inspect them, and thus cannot be pressured by governments that enforce absurd laws to pass on information on who might be engaging in "unlawful" activities.
[1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-diff...
Is there any proof they actually abandoned this? NeuralHash seems alive and well in iOS 16[1]. Supposedly the rest of the machinery around comparing these hashes to a blind database, encrypting those matches, and sending them to Apple et al. to be reviewed has all been axed. However that's not exactly trivial to verify since Photos is closed source.
[1]: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/find-and-delete-dupli...
Therein lies the rub: the payload itself is protected by an encryption scheme where the keys are intentionally being withheld by either party. In the case of Apple's proposed CSAM detection Apple would be withholding the secret in the form of the unblinded database's derivation key. In the case of Advanced Data Protection the user's key lives in the SEP, unknown to Apple.
By design the interior of the "safety vouchers" cannot be inspected, supposedly not even by Apple, unless you are in possession of (a) dozens of matching vouchers and (b) the unblinded database. So on the wire you're just going to see opaque encrypted containers representing a photo destined for iCloud.
The vouchers were encrypted, and could only be decrypted if there were, I believe, 30 independent matches against their CSAM hash table in the cloud. At that point the vouchers could be decrypted and reviewed by a human as a check against false-positives.
It sounds like with a raw byte hash they might be able to match a photo against a list of CSAM hashes, but they wouldn't be able to do the human review of the photo's contents because of E2E.
If the hashes are cryptographic, then this is impossible (given today's technology).
> with the ones in the CSAM hash database
The CSAM hash database isn't public AFAIK.
> I remember someone posting about a year ago a bunch of strange looking images that produced those collisions.
You're probably thinking about their proposed 'perceptive hash', which has since been scrapped.
Edit: confirmed that these are regular, real checksums https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
> The raw byte checksums of the file content and the file name
I wonder if this is literal; otherwise they wouldn't achieve any de-dupe if you just rename the file.
Personally, I don't think Apple intends to screw you, and they have a good reason, but isn't not trusting your provider the entire point of e2e encryption?
It is one of the first question I asked myself: "with e2e encryption, it means no de-duplication, it will be expensive for Apple". Turns out they still have de-duplication, and therefore weaker privacy.
Anyways, "As we continue to strengthen security protections for all users, Apple is committed to ensuring more data, including this kind of metadata, is end-to-end encrypted when Advanced Data Protection is enabled". It would be interesting to see if they really are committed. For now, I don't blame them, it is already better than most offerings, and it just came out. However, it will be an interesting point to watch for in the future: it is a privacy feature that actually costs Apple money to run, will they do it?
Note: I assume a standard hash like SHA, working at byte level. Not the CSAM scanning thing that can match similar pictures even if the files are not exactly the same.
If someone has all kinds of duplicates, so what? Eventually, they have to pay and up their subscription price for the additional cloud storage. The only way de-duplicating could possibly save money is if two or more people with the same file are both pointed to that same file in a location that is not within their account.
I don't buy this de-duplication argument.
This is likely describing content-addressable storage. It is the underpinning of many iCloud services that store user files / blobs. It is also a commonly used pattern in backend services generally.
The presentation about ZFS' native encryption[1] covers many of these sorts of trade-offs necessary to do full-disk encryption at scale.
So I read this as Apple quietly saying "we're not bending to China on privacy". Which is the first step toward probably being banned from providing Apple services in China.
Unfortunately, I think the privacy problems surrounding iCloud Photos remain to an extent.
It's a lot easier to tell vendor X that "in country Y list Z is the one that should be used when looking for CSAM", and then add some known Tank Man derivative hashes to that list and find out directly who to arrest.
> Some metadata and usage information stored in iCloud remains under standard data protection, even when Advanced Data Protection is enabled. For example, dates and times when a file or object was modified are used to sort your information, and checksums of file and photo data are used to help Apple de-duplicate and optimize your iCloud and device storage
This checksum is described as:
> The raw byte checksum of the photo or video
This hash can technically be shared by Apple, since they own the key used to encrypt it. And depending on when the hash is computed (post-encryption it's no problem, pre-encryption we have a problem), this could technically be used to find people sharing known undesired images e.g. Tank Man or CSAM.
There is no way for a user to verify if Apple has actually end-to-end encrypted their backups or not.
Who are they sorting it for that this can't happen after decryption?
I mean, unlike perceptive hashing, cryptographic hashes do not lie.
If that article is correct it doesn't sound like they've abandoned the idea at all, only modified. It's still the same thing essentially, they check your file hashes for "known illegal images or other law enforcement inquiries".
Photo checksums can't be e2e encrypted huh? They reported today they abandoned their plans to do CSAM scanning on people's devices[1] and connecting the dots it seems like they wont need to since they can just do it in the cloud.
[1] https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun...