AMF and other top givewell charities seem far more focused on the good they can do than more classic charities like WWF or Plan Parenthood.
And even this punts on perceptive utility, the kind that Nozick warns us about[1]: it's entirely possible that Johnny in Country X gets more utility out of $100 in charitable giving than 50 others in Country Y. But this seems like a really bad logical consequence, the kind that the Internet Rationalist EA community uses to justify spending money on AGI research instead of donating to AMF.
Overall, it's much easier to live in a world where we can determine that some set of charities are worth giving to, and not try too hard to order between them.
Do you think that some charities are more effective than other ones?
Do you think we should try to measure that to determine which ones are more effective?
Most charitable donations are net good. Sure there exist a small subset of charities that aren't probably doing harm but that's the exception.
Would you argue that charitable giving is neutral or bad?
But I suppose I would say it's neutral; it could be good or bad depending on various characteristics of the charity itself.
But do you at least agree the government does less good with 20 cents than a givewell charity like the AMF does with a dollar?
It's certainly the scale of impact difference between some of the charities:
Charities can be useless or actively harmful: https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/criteria/im...
vs.
$4500/life saved: https://www.givewell.org/our-giving-funds#Top_Charities_Fund
They also say why it's that high: https://www.givewell.org/impact-estimates
Another example I've heard is hospitals asking people to stop skydiving to raise money for them, as the mean cost of medial care the average skydiver needs due to skydiving injuries exceeds the average money raised by skydiving.
Here's a hopefully intuitive framing: actions are built on outcomes, while institutions are built on motives. It's hard to imagine a consequential derivation of fundamental and inviolable human rights, for example: there will always be cases and circumstances where a consequential view of morality enables you to engage in casuistry to suit the occasion. I'd much rather build (and live under) practical moral systems where things stay right and wrong.
(To be clear: motive itself is not the moral object, in my view. Motive is merely the thing being questioned. The moral object is the moral law.)
Why do you think all charities are equally good?
There are good charities, and there are bad charities. One of the things that can make a charity bad is having a bad mission. Another thing that can make a charity bad is being corrupt or inefficient. But I don’t presume to order charities based on how bad or good they are, and I don’t think there’s anything particularly good about giving to one good charity versus another good charity.
Also, “insensible” does not mean “insane.” I meant that it does not make sense, in my moral system.
You're happy to assign a number of 1 or 0, but would never want to rank them any more than that? That doesn't make sense to me.
There are lots of ethical theories (a majority, in fact!) that don't require (but may admit) grading actions on a sliding scale from "morally worst" to "morally best." Moral systems all boil down to a Theory of Right, and it's possible to have a Theory of Right rooted in virtue or autonomy rather than Good (i.e., greatest consequence).
This is probably far more obvious at small units like families, where we are all well aware of the existence of absolutely miserable rich kids who might live short, drug-addicted lives that end in suicide, in spite of their parents giving them all the money in the world.
> when someone is known publicly to donate, it becomes impossible to distinguish truly benevolent motives from self-interested ones (even if those self-interested motives don't "really" matter from a Utils perspective).
Who cares why someone donates, as long as they donate? Is there some thing called "truly benevolent" donations which keep more people alive longer, or have some other measurable impact? I actively am having trouble parsing this. It seems like you realize how ridiculous this sounds, by adding the bit at the end about how it doesn't matter, but then why even bring it up? Like what is special about "truly benevolent" giving?
It's not as though these motives don't "really" matter, they ... just don't matter at all?