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A comment on Apple Execs on iMessage for Android (2013). Parent comment

Re:Apple Execs on iMessage for Android (2013) by aendruk on Monday November 07, 2022 @12:07PM (#33508657)
Signal, WhatsApp, and iMessage make E2EE the norm, while others relegate it to some “I’m being sneaky now” switch.

Framing fundamental privacy measures as sneaky mode is actively harmful to their broader adoption, paints a target on the few people who do have dire need for protection, and makes us all vulnerable to efforts to legislate against what progress we’ve made.

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Re:Apple Execs on iMessage for Android (2013) by vetinari on Monday November 07, 2022 @12:42PM (#33509225)
> Signal, WhatsApp, and iMessage make E2EE the norm

E2E. yes; explicit key management, no.

So basically you are getting encryption on your device, but do not know, who can decrypt.

About the only messaging app that makes some effort on key verification and keys cannot be changed randomly is Threema.

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Re:Apple Execs on iMessage for Android (2013) by aendruk on Monday November 07, 2022 @12:45PM (#33509270)
(?) You’re replying under a thread about the ranking of WhatsApp vs. Facebook Messenger in a list that doesn’t even include Threema.
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Re:Apple Execs on iMessage for Android (2013) by vetinari on Monday November 07, 2022 @01:06PM (#33509597)
The thread developed into E2EE. Threema was an example how to do it more correctly, and to show what the others are doing wrong, giving an incorrect sense of security when there is none.
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