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Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox by sdfhbdf on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @10:08AM (#33421440)
> […] use their hardware authentication key to pass a One Time Password (OTP) to the malicious site. This eventually succeeded, […] It’s interesting that it succeeded, I was under the impression, making some assumptions that using a Hardware key like Yubikey would prevent such attack since the challenge-response in the browser communication with the key contains the domain (which I assume was different) and hence would fail to generate proper OTP for wrong domain.

I assume they, or their vendor - CircleCI (which i haven’t used), had some older implementation of the standard that maybe relied just on the string generated by the hardware key without challenge-response.

I’m glad they caught it and they immediately see WebAuthn as a good successor. This should definitely prevent such attack vector. Nice.

Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox by jaywalk on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @10:38AM (#33421820)
I have to assume by "hardware authentication key" they're referring to RSA SecurID. Yubikey would indeed prevent an attack like this from working.

Although I wouldn't expect a company like Dropbox to be using RSA SecurID.

Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox by jsty on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @11:38AM (#33422670)
> Yubikey would indeed prevent an attack like this from working.

It would using U2F / WebAuthn. Some Yubikeys support generating TOTP codes [0], which would be vulnerable to phishing attacks

[0] https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013789259-Us...