No check mode reuses the auth of the tailscale client, check mode authenticates the ssh connection itself
I feel like there should be a lightweight way to use SSH certificates, so you could use it independently or on top of Tailscale. Like a server (CA), client and daemon on your machines that should be reachable via SSH that handles short lived certs and authentication of clients. But I'm not aware of anything like that.
I have used Teleport before but it seemed not that great for machines not publicly reachable, because then all the traffic goes through a proxy.
Gravitational’s Teleport seems pretty good, but it’s heavyweight and doesn’t have any pricing appropriate for small businesses.
The configuration is:
Host vm.example.com ProxyCommand bash -c '/usr/local/bin/cloudflared access ssh-gen --hostname %h; ssh -tt %[email protected] >&2 <&1'
Host cfpipe-vm.example.com HostName vm.example.com ProxyCommand /usr/local/bin/cloudflared access ssh --hostname %h IdentityFile ~/.cloudflared/vm.example.com-cf_key CertificateFile ~/.cloudflared/vm.example.com-cf_key-cert.pub
Think about this a bit. Contemplate what happens if you use sftp, vscode remoting, or anything else nontrivial. Hint: “cloudflared access ssh-gen” is not actually any sort of proxy, and the ssh -tt command is a kludge that should, if openssh were more on the ball about inherited file descriptors, should not work at all.
The right way to to this is to use Match … exec. Or to ask openssh to add an option for a command to execute before reading IdentityFile. Or to ask for an IdentityFileCommand option. Or to use a custom ssh agent.
If Tailscale's client was a userspace construct bound to a specific user SSH program, maybe fine. But Tailscale's client is a regular VPN client. What happens if you connect to the Tailscale VPN, open a malicious but sandboxed app of some sort, and that app connects to the target on TCP port 22.
For all that it's a seriously unfinished product, Cloudflare's SSH offering seems better thought out. Perhaps Tailscale should find a way to issue a short-lived certificate and use that in addition?
(It looks like regular sshd could almost be convinced to handle this. If the SSH_CONNECTION environment variable were passed to the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper or if the source and destination were available as '%' tokens, then AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand could do the Tailscale tuple lookup and use it as a second factor in addition to a short-lived certificate (or regular SSH key or whatever). I bet openssh would accept a patch for this.)