pquerna
Calling it "Modified" MIT is just misleading.
But it turns out, all the major IDPs support OIDC now. It's a non-issue.
"Ex-Intel executives raise $21.5 million for RISC-V chip startup":
https://www.aheadcomputing.com/
I believe the founding team is all in Oregon - and mostly all ex-Intel.
https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/overview-of-enhanced...
2024-07-23 - Vulnerability introduced as part of a standard Okta release
This issue is not an "okta is old" issue. this was new code written in 2024 that used a password hashing function from 1999 as a cache key.
it's all volunteers/open source, but this isn't an ASF project.
IT Workers Infiltrated More Than 300 U.S. Companies, Earning Millions
Wondering HNs collective wisdom on this-- at work we've been using Access Controls on our homepage for awhile- https://www.conductorone.com/ - to the people outside the IAM-geek space does this make more sense?
This fork also implements Redis Client Pipelining to check multiple limits at the same time, and Concurrency Limits.
https://pwnedkeys.com/submit.html
Which if you had an standardized representation of that attestation, maybe CAs could consume that instead.
But, the author of pwnedkeys thought of that, and started an RFC for exactly that:
https://github.com/pwnedkeys/key-compromise-attestation-rfc/...
But it seems dead right now.
It made it debuggable via output if needed, but the primary consumption became span oriented.
I mean it seems like its clearly a key that wasn't in an HSM.. and over the lifetime, hundreds? Thousands of Github employees could of accessed it?
https://lwn.net/Articles/637156/
I'm honestly not familiar with anyone actually using host-key rotation?
SVB Panic
three questions / thoughts:
1) Your post mentions "Ranking", and while do the most impactful work first is great, the method I have most often used is when dealing with Vuln-overload is to "Reclassify". That is Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) (super flawed as it is) has let reporters check the box for "remotely exploitable" therefore its a 8.0 HIGH vulnerability -- but I think your product could let me reclassify the vuln to a medium/low - maybe a built in CVSS score editor?
2) One other thing there should also be a built-in concept of "accepting the risk" -- and ideally a concrete report of what was previously "accepted", and if that package gets used in new ways?
3) I'm curious what you think about market segmentation in this space? Specifically the sub-200? person companies seem to be using alot of the "all in one" Compliance platforms (eg, Vanta, Drata, etc). Vanta for example does have a vuln management + SLA tracking dashboard + ticketing tools.
Other thought I had, is there any concept of expiration of permissions?
Something I ran into when I used to do more Apache Software Foundation work was that, we had thousands of committers with shell access -- but 94% never used it. Are any of the things protected by this privileged? eg, a release private key?
i added support for httpd to support systemd socket activation in 2013: https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1511033
httpd can start as non-root, assuming other configurations like the access / error logs are writable by the non-root user.
The "best" thing we did was actually using a "template database": https://www.postgresql.org/docs/14/manage-ag-templatedbs.htm...
We would start a Postgres Process. We would create a new database, run all of our migrations and basic data bring up. Then we would create a new Database per Test Suite, using the one we just ran migrations as the Template.
This meant the initial bring up was a few seconds, but then each test suite would get a new database in a dozen milliseconds (IIRC).
Big Ass Data Broker Opt-Out List
Few months later:
https://techcrunch.com/2012/11/28/log-data-management-and-an...
> Less than a year after the company’s public launch, Sumo Logic has closed a number of large-scale enterprise client deals including Netflix
No repercussions for Sumo Logic at this point - they IPO'ed in September 2020 -- https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SUMO
Panther Going Closed Source
But midway through, there is some really broad and overreaching concepts.
When the goal is "No Unilateral Changes to Critical Software", this implies that there is "one" way to run an open source community. I'm not saying its a bad idea, its just that its weird for Google to "mandate" it just because a project is popular and therefore critical.
And then there is the big one, "Authentication for Participants in Critical Software" -- ie, you can't be anonymous to contribute to an open source project.
Know, Prevent, Fix: A framework for vulnerabilities in open source
2) You can control all response filters at the byte level with an Output Filter.
3) Hooks already exist for this: https://ci.apache.org/projects/httpd/trunk/doxygen/group__ho...
4) No. Bucket Brigades is the API for this. It's an efficient linked-list of future-data. It's a good API IMO, just needs some understanding, and because its in C, its full of macros (there are more alternatives to making it cleaner if we weren't using C)