The traditional boundary is one drawn by device ownership: my device, my rules; their device, their rules. I.e. my phone can do whatever, their servers can refuse working with me.
Remote attestation is at best a way for simplifying their own service, at a big cost to users' freedom. In reality, it's a bit of that, plus mostly making sure the customers are locked into a bank-controlled channel that can be used to upsell more financial products.
Your device your rules seems to cover this, too: they’re saying they don’t want to do business under other rules – the app is just showing the UI for that policy client side.
It’s frustrating but that seems not unreasonable given the massive ratio of people being compromised versus intentionally customizing the OS. I miss the free-for-all of the 90s in some ways but statistically zero of the non-IT people I know wouldn’t hand root on their phone over to some guy in another country based on a prompt on a webpage.
I guess I see two problems here:
1) They shouldn't be allowed to make that policy in the first place. Their policy is effectively dictating what devices I can own and what can I do with them, which is unreasonable when the devices in question are general-purpose computers.
2) My device is being used against me and against my wishes here; I'm not sure who's more to blame here - the bank for taking advantage of the API, Google for providing it, or the phone vendor for implementing it and locking me out of it, or Google again for effectively forcing the phone vendor to lock me out of it.
> I miss the free-for-all of the 90s in some ways but statistically zero of the non-IT people I know wouldn’t hand root on their phone over to some guy in another country based on a prompt on a webpage.
There must be some other way of handling it. We wouldn't have the Fisher-Price tech of 2020s without the free-for-all 90s! The ability for technically proficient users to do whatever the hell they want with their own general-purpose computers is fundamental to developing new technologies, products and services, and better alternatives to existing ones. Between Fisher-Price consumer tech and locked down corporate tech (because security!), it looks like we're heading for an era where a general-purpose computer will be something available only to few certified employees in corporate-sponsored labs.
That’s not a theoretic DRM issue, but a practical attack on the software ecosystem.
In terms of practical security, custom ROMs are often safer than the forgotten and obsolete software left on a device when updates stop rolling out. Sandbox escapes and exploits to get root access are more realistic threats than airport security flashing a different OS through your phone recovery or some kind of conspiracy to stuff malware into an open source repository.
As long as you take care to only install software from reliable sources (i.e. download.lineageos.org, F-Droid.org) I don't see the problem.
The problem is that if you are inside a project developing something like this, you can clearly visualize your expected use case, but it's impossible to know what other use cases will be contrived. Of course in this case, we have predicted a few major malfeasances and I think anyone supporting a project like this needs to know the harmful use cases and be responsible for developing with them in mind.
Thanks to remote attestation, the custom ROM scene for Android is pretty much dead now, because there's little point of customizing the OS when it automatically makes important services no longer accessible from the phone.