The thing about the Iron Rule (which I agree with) is that it appears in online forums too. In placaes like Wikipedia, Stack Overflow and various forums the community divides into three groups:
1. Content creators: those who past and answer questions, etc;
2. Moderators: those who write and enforce rules and standards; and
3. Lurkers: those who simply read.
The second group, while useful, has to constantly be kept in check. No matter how originally (and concurrently) well-intentioned, there will always be a tendency to create and enforce more rules to solve perceived and actual "problems".
I'd be interested to know what psychology drives people to join the moderator camp.
In well-policed communities where moderators actively listen to users, or where people feel reporting and flagging mechanisms work, I would imagine people generally feel empowered enough that they are satisfied remaining a regular user.
I don't think many moderators seek to expand their rulesets, as it really just becomes additional (often free) work for them. Increasing and enforcing more rules is a cost that is only worth bearing when what isn't being actioned is causing enough damage to warrant the additional work.
> 1. Content creators: those who past and answer questions, etc;
> 2. Moderators: those who write and enforce rules and standards; and
Not that simple, especially on Wikipedia. Often but not always, the initial reputation of "moderators" is gained by being a "prolific contributor". Even after becoming a moderator, it's still common for one to continue contributing high-quality content. This system is commonly described as a "meritocracy" but not without vocal critics (on whether it's a true "meritocracy", and on whether "meritocracy" is a good system).
This creates a lot of complications. From my experience, many of the most toxic Wikipedia political struggles arise as a result of the conflicts between:
1. One's opinion about the subject in the article.
2. One's opinion about the quality of the article itself.
3. One's opinion about the editorial policy that is supposed to be applied to the article.
4. One's opinion about another editor as a person.
5. One's opinion about another editor's opinion on (2), (3), and (4).
I think the same thing happens in free and open source software projects as well.
I genuinely wonder what would be the outcome in an alternative system of which moderators are purely neutral observers and do not particulate or contribute content themselves, and what are the advantages and disadvantages in both systems.
I expect that the benefit is: reduced personal attachment on particular issues, and that would be helpful on reducing unnecessary conflicts. However, no personal attachment also means there's no personal motivation on actually solving the problems.
It examines a particularly democratic union which seemed unusually able to withstand degeneration into an oligarchy.
> When the Director of the CDC asserts an opinion, she has to optimize for two things - being right, and keeping power. If she doesn't optimize for the second, she gets replaced as CDC Director by someone who does. That means she's trying to solve a harder problem than Zvi is, and it makes sense that sometimes, despite having more resources than Zvi, she does worse at it.
It seems to me like the issue is actually in rent-seeking, where the more rent-seeking you have available, the more the marginal mistake person converts into a conflict person. In a world of perfect competition there would be no room for conflicts, and only once you have freely available rents does the land-grabbing phase begin. When your rules are written by the conflicters, for the conflicters benefit, it's already to late. They'll certainly never compromise on the simple correct path.
[0]: https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/01/24/conflict-vs-mistake/
[1]: https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/webmd-and-the-tragedy-...
"Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy states that in any bureaucratic organization there will be two kinds of people":
First, there will be those who are devoted to the goals of the organization. Examples are dedicated classroom teachers in an educational bureaucracy, many of the engineers and launch technicians and scientists at NASA, even some agricultural scientists and advisors in the former Soviet Union collective farming administration.
Secondly, there will be those dedicated to the organization itself. Examples are many of the administrators in the education system, many professors of education, many teachers union officials, much of the NASA headquarters staff, etc.
The Iron Law states that in every case the second group will gain and keep control of the organization. It will write the rules, and control promotions within the organization."
https://www.jerrypournelle.com/reports/jerryp/iron.html