To me it does seem a low target to aim for. VSCode shows they can execute, but for some reason when the stakes are higher they don't do as well Windows Phone, Edge browser, etc. I suppose I could call that corporate self-awareness.
The other possible takeaway is that after Windows Phone, Microsoft really has been truly risk adverse when it comes to consumer products, even in areas where they had a lead and could have delivered something no one else could.
> VSCode shows they can execute, but for some reason when the stakes are higher they don't do as well Windows Phone
Windows Phone was arguably very well executed at the software level. Microsoft's troubles with Windows Phone were at the hardware levels and (worse) the economic levels where the phone carriers had already decided they prefer a duopoly and selling three things is one too many things to sell.
(I had more inconvenience moving apps back and forth between WPF and Silverlight in some of the years prior, and even those moves were never from-scratch rewrites. Admittedly that may have left me with more skills to handle XAML changes and write to lowest common denominator XAML, so I am aware of my biases.)
I realize you aren't ever going to agree with me on this, and I don't expect you to. I do think it is still useful for other people to see that there are counter-opinions here.
Not going to bother to list everything that changed, it is public available for anyone to judge.
That's the only "hard fork" between the versions. I know a lot of people (including respondents in neighboring comments) saw the changes between WP8 and WP10 as a big deal "soft fork", but very little actually changed other than a UI library upgrade from 1.x to 2.x. (In .NET; JS was dropped in 2.x and C/C++ developers saw some other shenanigans. But JS and C/C++ didn't exist in WP7 either so none of those developers saw all three "migrations" either.)
I hear a lot from developers that it seemed very fragmented, but working in it at the time, it seemed very "incremental" at best, mostly just upgrading library major versions and dealing with semver major breaking breaks. Sure, that's frustrating when that's not your primary development environment and also you aren't getting paid enough for it because adoption is low, but that is a very far cry from "Microsoft didn't have a good plan". They were iterating hard on it. They made some semver breaks that other library authors in other ecosystems could get away with no problem, even with equally low adoption (looking at random JS libraries here). It's easy to blame low adoption for making those semver major breaks seem more painful and "fragmented" than they actually were in practice, but sometimes it just also looks like that was an excuse to ignore the platform more than a problem for development experience reality. (As you seem to state that you skipped the platform entirely, possibly because you were looking for an excuse to skip it and latched onto the first one you saw.)
[1] Obviously not clear enough for some.
It's one thing to develop versions for Android, iOS, and Windows Phone. It's another if the UX source elements can't be shared within the MS ecosystem Phone, RT, x86 metro apps.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/...
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/porting/porting-to-the...
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/msdn-magazine/2014...
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/uwp/porting/wpsl-t...
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/uwp/porting/w8x-to...
I also think it's obvious, but then salient things are. Consumers today don't decide between PC vendors and operating systems, but between entire company-branded computing ecosystems. Are you on the Google or Apple or Amazon train?
Things Stratechery doesn't discuss enough and this article is poor about:
- Unlike in the Windows days, in the new competing-ecosystems world, geopolitics plays a much grander role. Everyone used to be on Windows, not everyone is on Google. China, Korea, Russia all have their own ecosystem juggernauts. In our globally interconnected world, computing has become somehow less globalized recently.
- Microsoft doing VR stuff on Facebook's platform is totally in line with their observations on Microsoft's strategy going forward, but Microsoft and Facebook also compete on the ecosystem front, and the implications of this are just brushed over here as that's not the article, but it would be a more interesting one.
- The really interesting thing that sets these different companies apart is their revenue sources. Apple sells hardware (and content and lifestyle), Microsoft sells enterprise software subscriptions and cloud, Google sells ad space and cloud.
This feels like a Citation Needed assumption both in this comment and in the article. Again, there's too much of a straight line here: Microsoft has always been one of (if not the) largest software development companies for the Macintosh. That has never changed.
We all know Ballmer was a huge Windows cheerleader and "home team supporter" and wanted to make sure that the best experiences were always on Windows. But he never killed Macintosh support. He championed the iPad versions of Office that Nadella is credited for (which the article even points out!). The closest Microsoft ever came to being "Windows only" was maybe the brief glimmer of optimism under Nadella where the Windows 10 team briefly imagined that every device could run Windows (and then felt the crushing disappointment to realize that most wouldn't).
Again, it doesn't look like a full circle to me but a mostly straight line with a few zigs and zags if you zoom in micro-enough. I understand where some of this is coming from that Microsoft did have years, especially under Ballmer, where they seemed to care too much about Windows, but Microsoft was never "just" The Windows Company in any era.
Not true. IBM was one of the top 10 most profitable companies in the world as recently as 2015.
After adjusting for real inflations rates, inclusive of asset inflation, they actually made greater profits some years then either Google or Meta or Amazon do today.
Now it doesn't matter all that much anymore if you're on a Mac or a Windows or a Linux computer. You can largely use the same apps and services across them (with the exception of gaming, which, as an interesting aside, is now much better on Linux than on Mac). Anyone expending the effort to make a new app will usually build them that way, while in the past, you had a lot of platform exclusives.
But what is new and interesting is that a Google account doesn't deliver you as much value in South Korea because a lot of its services are unavailable or bad there, while it's nigh on impossible to live without a Kakao account, which in turn is entirely optional in, well, most everywhere else.
I find it fascinating that the global reach of user-centric/service-oriented computing is less than the reach of the previous device-oriented computing. It's certainly also not true that geopolitics have never mattered before in computing and reaching users, but I'd say they matter more than ever before.
When things were device-oriented whoever had the better devices naturally got easy footholds in every country. Since any country that tries to outcompete the world leading products would have needed to invest vast sums of money. And even then 90% of the supply chain would still be in the typical locations.
It simply made sense for everyone to leave the multi-billion dollar investments to a few multinationals, at least for consumer products.
The only real exception being Japan pre-iPhone, when they had the manufacturing diversity to make nearly everything domestically and enough wealthy consumers who also didn't care much for international interoperability. And even then the major Japanese firms were making very slim profits.
Whereas since the entry bar for creating competitive software is so much lower, many countries can afford to nurture genuinely homegrown products, and have a reasonable expectation that they will be competitive.
I don't think it's that. It's that eg. Kakao has KakaoTalk, a chat app. And chat apps tend towards monopolies and oligopolies because of network effects. The value of the app is less in how good it is, and more in who else uses it.
If you're just buying a music player or an office suite for a common file format, what you use doesn't really matter to anyone else, and their choices to you.
Chat apps, collaboration platforms? Suddenly, who else uses them matters a lot, since it's about the people, not the physical function. And once you get big enough, the network effects turns from a hurdle into a gigantic moat.
The question of how many people use any given physical product, such as music players, certainly matters to supply chain executives and factory managers at the very least.
Because the same network effects applies to manufactured products, notably in economics of scale.
More generally, it's true that KakaoTalk benefits from network effects, but Facebook Korea could have benefited from the same.
It's just that a homegrown Korean chat app is viable against Facebook Korea because the entry bar is lower, whereas a homegrown Korean iPod would have been laughable against Apple, even in Korea.
There's very few people that would have paid 5x more for an all Korean iPod, but most are fine with being slightly inconvenient by Kakao's smaller international userbase.
This isn’t a surprise given the sales numbers of hardware and DAU of meta online properties. While they are the clear leader in VR, given how great the Quest 2 and its original pricing were it should have had much higher sales numbers and usage. That result also wasn’t a surprise given that the Facebook brand was so toxic to the masses, that even changing names to meta hasn’t mitigated it yet in the short term. The name change will pay off eventually for younger generations who aren’t very familiar with Facebook, but that day is about a decade away
It's hard for it to be a "full circle" when for the most part it looks like a straight line. The surprise shift here isn't in Microsoft but in Meta finally asking for help and partners after seeming to believe they could do it all on their own.